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This thesis is mainly about the Kashmiri Muslims’ uprising in India in 1989. The uprising 
is viewed as the internal conflict between the Indian state’s bad policies  to repress the 
Muslim ethnic group in Kashmir and the Kashmiris’ challenge against such an authority 
of India. The puzzles that this thesis raises: Why did the uprising break out? As it broke 
out, why did it break out in 1989, and not before? The study identifies both underlying 
causes and triggering causes of the uprising. The central argument is that the current 
dimension of the Kashmiri uprising is the continuation of the past, and therefore, the end-
result of the Indian government endemic “misrule” (underlying macro-political causal 
factor) in Kashmir. This, in turn, created sufficient grounds to assert their (Kashmiri 
Muslim) distinct separate Muslim identity (ethno-religious factor) making Kashmir a case 
of enthnonationalism. Enthnonationalism took roots because they sensed that they were 
relatively deprived from their rights and share. This sense of relative deprivation 
(economic and political factors) led to increasing ethnic/political mobilization (triggering 
micro-political causal factor) among Kashmiris, especially within the new-generation. 
Their awakening to the realization of relative deprivation and their efforts towards 
ethnic/political mobilization were made possible by high rate of literacy among the 
Kashmiris and their access to media: both audio and video and the “diffusion” effect from 
the similar incidents happening across the border. Although the current uprising is chiefly 
driven internally by the Indian elite’s bad policy (Brown’s leadership-centric approach), 
it is also reinforced by external factors. The external factors included the successful 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 (cultural/religious factor), the rise of the Palestinian Intifada 
movement and the eventual establishment of the Palestinian state (religio-cultural factor), 
the Soviet fiasco in Afghanistan (political factor), the ethnic-based uprising in the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (ethnonationalism factor), and more important, the 
Pakistani support (bad neighbor policy) for the Kashmiri rebels. These external factors 
were tangential to the uprising. The causal direction was bi-directional and not 
unidirectional. However, now that the genie, the uprising, has come out of the bottle, it 
will keep bedeviling the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. The Kargil crisis of 
1999 amply testified that. The 1989 uprising has transformed Kashmir into a new and 
ongoing area of conflict in which India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people all have a 
stake. 
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A CHRONOLOGY OF THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 
 
? to A. D. 741   Pre-Muslim Period 
A.D. 711 Beginnings of Islam, Hanmim, a Syrian, was the first 
Muslim to arrive in Kashmir. Rinchana, a Hindu 
military commander from Ladakh, re-named Sultan 
Sadr-ud-Din following his embrace of Islam, became the 
first Muslim ruler of India. 
1320 to 1560 A.C The Sultans of Kashmir (Kashmir as independent state) 
1320 Conversion of Rinchen or Rincana to Islam at the hands 
of Bulbul Shah. Rinchen becomes Sultan Sadr-ud-Din, 
the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir. 
1324 The first Muslim Mosque in Kashmir known as the 
Rinchen or Rintan Mosque. 
1372 Madrasahs established throughout the Valley for the 
teaching of the Qur’an and the imparting of Muslim 
learning.  
1846 to 1925 A.C. The Treaty of Amritsar signed between the British and 
Gulab Singh. Following this the Dogras rule began in 
Kashmir as British sold out Kashmir, Gilgit, and 
Ladakh to Gulab Singh. 
1885 Indian National Congress formed. 
1906 Muslim League formed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah.   
 xv
1925 Hari Singh succeeds his uncle Pratab Singh as ruler of 
Jammu amd Kashmir. 
1935 July 13, 1931 Mass agitation against Hari Singh by 
Kashmiri Muslims led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah 
(the Lion of Kashmir). 
14 August 1947 Mohamman Ali Jinnah sworn in as first Governor-
General of Pakistan. 
15 August 1947  Jawaharlal Nehru sworn in as Prime Minister and Lord 
Mountbatten as Governor-General of India. People of 
Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, and Baltistan revolt and accede to 
Pakistan. 
22 October 1947 Tribesmen from Northwest Frontier Province of 
Pakistan help fellow Muslims liberate Jammu and 
Kashmir from Hari Singh’s rule. Nehru calls them 
invaders. 
25 October 1947  V. P. Menon dispatched to Srinagar by Mountbatten to 
ask the Maharaja to accede to India. The Maharaja and 
his family abandoned capital and take refuge in Jammu. 
26 October 1947  The Maharaja Hari Sing signs the Instrument of 
Accession. 
27 October 1947  Mountbatten accepts the accession. Indian army 
intervenes in Kashmir. 
 xvi
1 January 1948  Nehru internationalized the Kashmiri conflict taking it 
to the United Nations and filed a complaint against 
Pakistan there. 
1948 India withholds Pakistan’s share of post partition 
development funds. Sardar Patel warns that “until 
Kashmir issue is settled, the financial pact between 
India and Pakistan cannot be implemented,” and says 
that Kashmir belongs to India. Gandhi goes on “fast 
unto death” to pressure India to release Pakistan’s 
share of money. 
April 1948  A UN Security Council resolution calls for the 
withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kashmir and the 
holding of a plebiscite, with a choice between accession 
to India and Pakistan..  
1 January 1949  India and Pakistan accept UN cease-fire line that 
divides Jammu and Kashmir. Approximately one-third 
of the state becomes Azad Kashmir (in Pakistan) and 
two-thirds becomes the Indian state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Nehru reaffirms the pledge for Kashmiri self-
determination through an internationally supervised 
plebiscite. Patel indicts the UN for mishandling 
Kashmir issue. Says “We accepted the UN 
 xvii
Commission’s cease-fire proposal bu the other party did 
not.” 
16 October 1951  Liaquat Ali Khan, first Prime Minister of Pakistan 
assissinated. Khawaja Nazimuddin takes over as Prime 
Minister. 
1954 Pakistan signs mutual defence agreement with the 
United States. Indians argue “that the circumstances in 
Kashmir have changed so completely that the original 
offer for a plebiscite is no longer vaild. India accepts the 
Kashmir constituent assembly’s vote of accession 
equivalent to a plebiscite.” Pakistan protests in the 
United Nations that India is trying to usurp Kashmir. 
1955 Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir adopts constitution 
that specifies the “state of Jammu and Kashmir is and 
shall be an integral part of the Indian Union.” 
25 May 1964  Sheikh Abdullah released from Jail and dispatched to 
Pakistan by Nehru to open negotiation.  
27 May 1964  Nehru dies suddenly. Lal Bahadur Shastri succeds as 
Prime Minister. Moi-Mubarak the holy relic of the 
Prophet Mohammad (SM) was stolen from Hazrat Bal 
Shrine. Massive unrest and demonstration in Jammu 
and Kashmir.  
 xviii
23 April 1965  India and Pakistan fight a key batten in the Rann of 
Kutch leading to India-Pakistan War of 1965 over 
Kashmir. 
8 May 1965  Sheikh Abdullah and Miraz Afzal Beg arrested and 
interned in South India. 
14 June 1965  Indian Prime Minister Shastri alleges that 3,000 to 
4,000 Pakistani infiltrators are in Kashmir and warns 
that India will respond if the “aggression” continues. 
6 September 1965  Second India-Pakistan war begins. India attacks several 
points in West Pakistan, including the city of Lahore. 
23 September 1965  India and Pakistan accept a cease-fire following a 
resolution passed by the Security Council of the UN. 
10 January 1966  President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister 
Shastri of India sign the Tashkent Declaration 
“affirming their obligation not to use force and [to] 
settle their disputes through peaceful means.” 
Leadership of the Soviet Union instrumental in the 
signing  of the Tashkent Declaration.  
7 January 1971  Sheikh Abdullah and his son-in-low barred from 
Kashmir, to keep them away from elections scheduled 
in March 1971. 
12 January 1971  Plebiscite Front declared an illegal organization.  
9 August 1971  Indo-Soviet Treaty signed. 
 xix
16 November 1971  Indian troops move into East Pakistan and begin 
advance toward Dacca. 
3 December 1971  Pakistan attacks India to divert its attention from East 
Pakistan. Third Indo-Pakistan war begins. 
16 December 1971  Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora of India 
accepts surrender in Dacca by Lieutenant General Niazi 
of Pakistan.  
June 1972  Sheikh Abudullah, Mirza Afzal Beg, and other leaders 
allowed to return to Kashmir.  
2   July 1972  Simla Agreement signed by Pakistan Prime Minister 
Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and Indian Primier India Gandhi. 
The accord confirmed a new line of control in Kashmir 
and attempted to provide the basis for a “durable 
peace” between India and Pakistan. 
May 1974  India tests its first nuclear bombs. 
2 July 1974  Sheikh Abdullah signs Kashmir Accord with Indira 
Gandhi. Kashmir agrees to continue as a constituent 
part of India in return for maintaining the terms of 
Article 370.  
1 March 1975  Pakistan lodges a protest in the UN that Kashmir 
Accord violates the Simal Agreement. 
April 1975  Sheikh Abdullah drift from Kashmir Accord and talks 
about merger of his state with Azad Kashmir. 
 xx
August 1981  National Conference leadership passes from Sheikh 
Abdullah to his son Farooq Abdullah. 
September 1982  Sheikh Abdullah dies.  
1972 to 1982  Periodic shooting across the cease-fire line but relatively 
little agitation in either Azad Kashmir or the Indian 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
May 1984  Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah dismissed and 
replaced by pro-Congress government headed by 
Ghulam Mohammad Shah, Farooq’s brother-in-law 
and chief rival. The opposition parties—save for 
Congress allied  AIADMK—condemn the 
“undemocratic removal” of Farooq Abdullah and his 
replacement by Shah. Farooq Abdullah latter forms a 
National Conference Congress coalition state 
government. 
1985 to 1989   Uprising by Kashmiri Muslims in the Indian state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
July 1989    Boycott of elections by Muslim population. 
1989 Governor Jagmohan replaces the incumbent Governor. 
Farooq Abdullah resigns. President’s rule imposed, and 
a crackdown on militants leaves 35 dead and 400 
wounded. Mirwaiz Farooq assassinated. His death 
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eliminates one of Kashmir’s most deeply revered and 
respected leaders. Militant protests continue. 
May 1998  India tests five nuclear devices; Pakistan answers by 
testing six; International sanctions are imposed on both 
states. 
January 1990  Government of Pakistan raised Kashmir issue with 
foreign dignitaries visiting Pakistan.  
1990 Protests and police crackdown continues. In Azad 
Kashmir, marchers attempt to reach the border to 
support protests on the Indian side. The government of 
Pakistan tries to maintain control by detaining leaders 
of the march.  
1991 Protests continue in the Indian state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The government of Pakistan considers the 
Kashmir issue as “a factor in its security environment.” 
2 April 1993  Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizbul 
Mujahideen sign an accord to unite their forces for the 
liberation of Kashmir. Protests continue and human 
rights violations intensify. 
October 1994  Backed by the Organization of Islamic Countries, 
Pakistan attempts to raise Kashmir issue at the UN. 
India strongly opposes the move.                    
 xxii
February 1999  In the Lahore Declaration, India and Pakistan argue to 
discuss Kashmir and take steps to avoid the risk of 
nuclear war. 
May/June 1999  The Kargil Crisis erupted pushing Pakistan and India 
on the threshold of fourth war on Kashmir issue                      
December 1999  Indian Air Line Plane was hijacked by the militants. 
Freeing of three Kashmiri rebels was demanded.  
January 2000  Indian government accepts the condition; the 

























I do not suggest that the Hindus and the Mahmedans will never fight. Two brothers 
living together often do so. We shall sometimes have our heads broken. Such a thing 
ought not to be necessary but all men are not equi-minded. 
 
-Mahatma K. Gandhi, Hind Swarj and other writings, Anthony J. Parel (ed.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 57 
 
Indian nationalism was dominated by Hindus and had a Hindunised look. So a 
conflict arose in the Muslim mind. Many accepted that nationalism, trying to 
influence it in the direction of their choice, many sympthised with it . . . and yet 
many others began to drift in a separatist direction . . . .  
 
-Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India, (London, Meridan, 1960): 304 
 
In this Alice-in-Wonderland world in which nation usually means state, in which 
nationalism usually means loyalty to the state, and in which ethnicity, primordialism, 
pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, parochialism and sub-nationalism 
usually mean loyalty to the nations, it should come as no surprise that the nature of 
nationalism remains essentially unprobed.  
 
Walker Connor, “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a . . .,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1:4 (1978): 396 . 
 
 
In a global age, one characterized by a global menu, global music and global time, 
the resurgence of claims to identity might be seen as a response to fear of 
disappearing into bland sameness. We can drink Coke, eat sushi and watch 
Neighbours and be in practically any country in the world. The fight for identity 
may at one level, be an example of resistance to such an image of global uni-identity. 
Alternatively, the struggle for identity may be a reaffirmation of belonging, in a 
postmodern, post-local age. This desire may be fuelled by nostalgia, a nostalgia for 
`tradition’, which might be construed as a nostalgia for the nation-state, the icon of 
modernity. Identities in this view may be increasingly fluid and multiply at ever 
more rapid rates as we approach the twenty-first century. But those properties do 
not make them analytically irrelevant to the international relations analyst. Who we 
are, how we are, who defines us, how international processes and events are moulded 
and manipulated by identities: these are all questions relevant to international politics. 
Anyone trying to make sense of international political trends in the near future who 
treats these maddeningly complex and infuriatingly dynamic identities as a mere 
mosquito to be swatted away risks being surprised (emphasis added). 
 
- Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” in Ken Booth 
and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity 











Geographically, economically, culturally, and religiously, Kashmir is a 
part of Pakistan. The overwhelming Muslim character of its population, its 
strategic position in relation to Pakistan, the flow of its rivers, the direction 
of its roads, the channels of its trade, the continual and intimate 
association which blinds it to the people of Pakistan from times 
immemorial, link Kashmir indissolubly with Pakistan. 
 
-Speech by Liaquat Ali Khan, first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Constituent 
Assembly (L) of Pakistan, 19 January 1959 as quoted in Sisir Gupta, 
Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, (New Delhi: Indian 
Council of World Affairs, 1998 (reprint), 1996 (first edition): 441.  
 
We cannot and we will not leave Kashmir to its fate. The fate of Kashmir 
was tied to the fate of Nehru family, their intertwined destiny—the fact is 
that Kashmir is of the most vital significance to India. There lies the 
rub . . . .We have to see it through to the end. Kashmir is going to be a 
drain on our resources but it is going to be a great drain on Pakistan.  
 
-Jawaharlal Nehru, first Prime Minister of India, Stanley Walpert, Nehru 
quoted in Brigadier (Retd.) M. Shafi Khan, Kashmir: The Accession to 
India: A Fraud (Lahore: Kashmir Study Centre, Pakistan, 1999): 424.    




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Muslim rulers administered Kashmir for about five hundred years. With the 
accession of Kashmir to India by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947, it became a bone of 
contention between Pakistan and India just right after their birth in 1947. In the fifty-three 
years of their history, India and Pakistan have fought three wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 
1971. Kashmir was the casus belli of the first two. To date, both hold a diametrically 
opposed view on Kashmir. The Pakistani official view of Kashmir is that it is “an 
unfinished mission” that has been put “on the back burner by the Indian government,” 
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and consequently, “the uprising was inevitable.”1 The Indian official line is that Kashmir 
has become “a finished chapter” long time ago, and therefore,“it is no longer a core 
issue” between Pakistan and India.2 To India, Kashmir’s accession to it was legal, and 
hence it views Kashmir as an integral part of it. Consequently, to the Indian government, 
Kashmir is nonnegotiable. By contrast, to the Pakistani government, the accession was 
totally illegal, and therefore it remains a disputed territory.3 For New Delhi, Kashmir is 
the only case through which it can vindicate its secularism. For Islamabad, it cannot 
substantiate its two-nation theory (Muslims and Hindus are two different nations and 
cannot coexist with each other) unless Kashmir becomes a part of it. Thus, right from the 
beginning a strong sense of irredentism kept ringing to the Pakistani ruling elite psyche. 
It became more virulent and exposed when Pakistan lost its eastern part, called East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), in its third war with India in 1971. Because of these opposed 
views, a siege mentality of zero-sum game (where my gain is your loss and vice versa) 
prevailed upon their dealings of the issue. 
  
The characteristic feature that distinguishes the current Kashmir conflict is the direct 
involvement of the Kashmiri people with the conflict. Before the uprising of the early 
1990s, the Kashmiri people were never an active actor to the conflict. Then, Kashmir was 
essentially a hostage to the bilateral conflict between Pakistan and India. The extent, level 
                                                          
1 Interview with Mr. Tariq Osman Haider, the Pakistani Ambassador in Seoul 24 February 2000.  
2 Interview with Mr. Santosh Kumar, the Indian Ambassador in Seoul 25 February 2000.  
3 In 1948 when Nehru took the Kashmir issue to the Uninted Nations Security Council (UNSC) in an 
attempt to internationalize it, the UNSC after studying the matter, passed a resolution declaring Kashmir as 
a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. The UNSC also made it clear in its resolution that the 
Kashmir conflict would be solved according to the plebisite. Nehru pledged so, and made a speech at the 
UNSC where he categorically mentioned that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved according to the 
“wishes of the people of Kashmir”. Eventually Nehru could not keep his pledge, rather followed a Kashmir 
 2
and severity of Kashmiri Muslims’ uprising are unique in the contemporary history of 
India. The April 2 1993 Agreement (Appendix VII) between the pro-Independent 
Kashmiri rebels the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the pro-Pakistani 
Kashmiri rebels the Hizbul Mujahedeen (HUM) shows the rebels’ resolute commitments 
to attain their azadi, meaning freedom.  The rebel groups, which have no identical goals 
and have no uniform profile (see Appendix VIII), have now suicide squads, and in fact, 
some suicide squad teams reportedly had gotten involved in the rebel activities.4  
 
The year 1989, which is considered as the cut-off point of the uprising, was marked by 
frequent strikes, targeted assassinations, bomb blasts and attacks on government property, 
thus causing serious political disorder in Kashmir. From 1989 to 1990, Indian press and 
official media estimated there were 40 to 300, or at most 400 (Rahman, 1996: 151) rebels 
operating in the Kashmir valley. In August 1990, Governor Saxena estimated them to be 
1,500 (Rahman, 1996: 151), but in October of the same year the estimation arose to 4,000 
[with another 4,000 waiting to sneak in from across the border] (Rahman, 1996:151). The 
Chief of Police of India claimed that there were 3,000 rebels at large in the valley, with 
3,000 to 8,000 more across the border of Pakistan (Rahman, 1996: 151).  
 
According to press reports, between July 1988 and December 1989, Indian forces killed 
300 Kashmiris, including five women students at a college (Rahman, 1996: 152) In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
policy that alienated the Kashmiris. For the role of the UN in resolving the Kashmir conflict and the related 
background, see (Korbel, 1956; Khan, 1956). 
4WWW. Deju.com In South Asia, the Tamils, who are struggling to establish their own separate homeland 
within Sri Lanka, have a very effective suicide squads. In 1986 theTamil suicide squads killed Rajiv 
Gandhi, the Premier of India. So was killed Premadasa in 1989, the President of Sri Lanka. Recently, the 
current President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumarantanga became the victim of the Tamil suicide squads in  
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contrast, a total of about 1,000 people were killed and 200 kidnapped by rebels by 18 July 












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Militants Civillians Security forces
 
Source: Jammu and Kashmir government, 1998 “India and Pakistan Survey”, in The 
Economist, 22 May 1999: 11 
 
 
 However, the event triggered a huge exodus of over 140,000 Hindus (Schofield, 1996: 
245) from the Kashmir valley, making them dubious of their fellow Muslim brothers with 
whom they lived for centuries in harmony and peace.5 On the other hand, the rebels 
religiously observed a blackout on 14 November, Nehru’s (the first Premier of India) 
birthday, and on 5 December, Sheikh Abdullah’s (first Premier of Kashmir) birthday to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
December 1999 and in January 2000, respectively, causing the loss of her right eyesight and killing a 
number of people.   
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display their contempt to these two great leaders because of their betrayals to the 
Kashmiri cause. By 1989, a number of significant rebel groups had begun operating 
throughout the valley (mainly through the towns of Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramula and 
Sopore) with their objective of either complete azadi, meaning independence or of 




The thesis tries mainly to grapple with the twin-puzzle. Why did, first of all, the uprising 
flare-up after a long period of local indifference? Second, why did it break out in 1989 
and not before? To address these twin puzzles, the study raises the following questions: 
Was the uprising a function of the Indian government’s “bad” policy or was it a function 
of a “bad neighbor’s policy” of Pakistan? Conversely, did the causes of the uprising stem 
from the internal setting or the external setting of India? In other words, was the uprising 
internally driven or externally driven?  
 
Scope and limitations 
 
The key objective of this thesis is to study the causes of the 1989 Kashmiri Muslims’ 
uprising that broke out in the Indian-part of Kashmir. The uprising has been viewed as 
the internal conflict between the Indian government (which sees it as a problem of 
disloyalty) and the Kashmiri Muslims who view the rule of Indian government as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 It has been maintained by some scholars that the Hindu exdous was intentially engineered by the Indian 
government so that it  could put the blame on the rebels to tarnish their images in the eye of the 
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repression of their rights and share. The study chiefly underscores the origin-dimension 
and time-dimension of the uprising. It also tries to reflect on the religious and cultural 
dimension of the uprising. While the above remains the central burden of the current 
thesis, it argues that the current uprising is a continuation of the past.  
 
This study is not a comprehensive history of the Kashmir conflict that surfaced in 1947 
when India and Pakistan were born. It does not aim at dealing with the solutions of the 
conflict either. Nor does it look at the options that India and Pakistan might have in the 
absence of the satisfactory resolution of the conflict. Although the thesis does not deal 
with the prospects of the resolution of the conflict, it does offer some policy implications 




The importance of the study is enormous in the context of both regional and extra-
regional politics. In International Relations the subject of internal conflicts of the states 
has always been a matter of scholarly interest because they have their far-reaching 
implications for the states confronting such conflicts and the external powers which get 
drawn to them.  If the internal conflicts were once mainly viewed as the Third World 
phenomena, with the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts in Europe in the aftermath of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, that notion had become a thing of the past 
(Tables 1.1 and 1.2).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
international community (see Rahman, 1996).    
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Table 1.1 Secession Efforts 
Region Sovereignty Affiliation To 




Basque regions Spain/France  
Bougainville Papua New Guinea  
Cabinda Angola Zaire 
Casamance Senegal  
Catalonia Spain  
Corsica France  
Karen people Myanmar (Burma)  
Kurdistan Iraq/Iran/Turkey/Azerbaijan  
Mindanao Philippines  
Northern Italy Italy  
Oromo Ethiopia  
Quebec Canada  
Scotland Britain  
Southern Sudan Sudan  
Tamil Eelam Srilanka India 
Zanzibar Tanzania  
 
Source: Karin von Hippel, “The Resurgence of Nationalism and its International Implications,” The 
Washington Quarterly, 17:4 (Autumn1994): 192. 
 
 
Table 1.2 Irredentist Efforts 
Region Sovereignty AffliationTo/Also 
Claimed By 
Beize Belize, & UK Guatemala/Mexico 
Ceuta (Sebta) & Melilla Falklands, South Gerogia, 
& South Sanwich Is. 
Spain  
(Malvinas Is.) Britain Argentina 
Gibraltar Britain Spain 
Golan Heights Israel Syria 
Guantanamo United States Cuba 
Hatay Turkey Syria 
Kashmir India Pakistan/China 
Kurile Is. Russia Japan 
Kuwait Kuwait Iraq 
Lebanon Lebanon Syria 
Mayotte France Comoros 
Northern Ireland Britain Republic of Ireland 
Ogaden Ethiopia Somalia 
Taiwan Taiwan China 
West Bank & East Jerusalem (Palestine) Israel Jordan/Palestinian 
people 
Spartely & Paracel Is. China/Vietnam Taiwan/Malaysia/Philip
pines/Brunei 
 
Source: Karin von Hippel, “The Resurgence of Nationalism and its International Implications,” The 
Washington Quarterly, 17:4 (Autumn1994): 192. 
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Currently, growing scholarly literature reflects the renewed interest in ethnic conflict both 
in the Third World and in Europe  (Brown, 1996; 1996-197; Ganguly, 1997; 1993: 88-
109; Hippel, 1994: 185-200; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Janke, 1996; Malik, 1992; 203-
214; Morris-hale, 1996; Posen, 1993: 27-47; 1996; Sadowski, 1998:12-23; Smith, 1991, 
1986; 1981; Smith, 1996; Weiner, 1993: 317-333).  
 
To India and Pakistan Kashmir is a life and death question. The 1989 uprising has further 
complicated the process. The Indian government spends US $ 1 million a day to maintain 
Indian outposts on the Siachen Glacier6, the world’s highest battlefield where India and 
Pakistan are confronting each other since 1984 (Singh, 1999e: 23).7 Although Pakistan 
spends lesser sums compared to India, it spends close to 38 percent of its budget on 
defence (Ganguly, 1998: 30). For Islamabad it is too burdensome. Furthermore, the 
Kashmir issue has never been boxed within the bilateral framework of India-Pakistan 
relations. It has drawn external powers to the subcontinental politics vitiating the political 
landscape of the region (Ahmed, 1989: 3; 1986: 6; also Cheema, 1992; Cohen, 1991; 
Choudhury, 1968; Gupta, 1956 [1995]; Malik, 1992; Rizvi, 1997; 1995a; 1995b). The 
issue remains a potential flash-point of war between India and Pakistan on the one hand, 
and a source of misunderstanding between them and the external powers, especially, the 
United States of America, on the other (Chintamoni, 1997: 987-997; Lamb, 1992; 
Hussain, 1992; Mehta, 1992; Harrison, 1992: 99-105).  
 
                                                          
6 Siahchen Glacier is strategically a very vital area for Pakistan and India. China also thinks it important for 
it, and both India and China have a long-drawn dispute on it. For details, (Ahmed, 1996: 100-115; 1994a: 
355-390). 
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From the developmental perspective, the Kashmir conflict has its deleterious effect on the 
economy of both Pakistan and India whose record of human development according to 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) human development index is worse 
(Table 1.3). Also worse is the level of poverty in the South Asian region compared to 
other regions (Table 1.4). 
 
Table 1.3 South Asia’s Picture on Human Development Index 
Country Rank Number  Value 
Sri Lanka 75 0.665 
Pakistan 120 0.311 
India 123 0.308 
Bangladesh 126 0.186 
Afghanistan 157 0.069 
 
Source: United Nations, Human Development Report 1991 
Note: All the listed countries experiencing acute ethnic conflicts of one kind or another excepting 
Bangladesh which has resolved its Chakma ethnic problem in 1996.  
 
Table: 1.4 Regional Distribution of Poverty, 1985-2000      
 (Figure in million) 
Region 1985  2000 
South Asia 500 350 
Sub-Sahara 175 250 
East Asia 225 50 
Europe, Middle East 50 50 
Americas 75 50 
 
Source: The World Bank, Human Development Report 1990, and Human  
Development Report 1992  
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 India plans to spend up to US $3.5 million a day on deploying an extra 25,000 troops on a permanent 
basis in Kargil (Sing, 1999e: 23). 
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Both the Pakistani and the Indian Ambassadors in Seoul, who underscored this point, 
hold that development programs in their respective countries are bound to suffer unless 
something is done about it.8 Doubtless that the Kashmir conflict shifts the attention of 
India and Pakistan from the developmental issues to the conflict one engaging them in a 
never-ending arms race (Ahmed, 1986; Ganguly, 1999; Gupta, 1996; Malik, 1992; Rizvi, 
1993; Rahman, 1996).  
 
The nuclearization of South Asia has further exacerbated the problem, hightening the U.S. 
concern as it has failed to stop ballastic missle race between India and Pakistan (Ahmed, 
1999; Bracken, 2000; Ganguly 1999; Perkovich, 1998). The fact that both New Delhi and 
Islamabad fought three wars (two on Kashmir) and the recent crises that erupted in 1984, 
1987, 1994, and 1999 (the Kargil crisis)9 centering on the Kashmir conflict speak in 




Although it has been found that the uprising was a function of both internal and external 
factors, it had mainly been caused by the Indian government’s bad policy (underlying 
cause) vis-à-vis the Muslim ethnic population in Kashmir. Factors such as relative 
deprivation, and enthnonationalism were found other underlying causal variables. These 
                                                          
8 The author’s interview with the Pakistani Ambassador on 24 February 2000, and the Indian Ambassador 
on 25 February 2000.   
9 For implications of the Kargil crisis for Pakistan’s domestic politics, and the peace and stability of the 
region see (Singh, 2000: 14; 1999a: 25-26; 1999b: 31; 1999c: 16-19; 1999d: 26; 1999e: 22-23; 1999f: 24-




underlying factors (excepting the ethnonationalism factor that has its external dimension 
too) also emanated from the internal setting of India. The key triggering factors such as 
ethnic/political mobilization and institutional/political decay and the most immediate 
catalyst triggering factors such as the 1985 Rajiv-Farooq Abdullah electoral alliance and 
the electoral wrongdoing in the 1987 and the 1989 elections were also found emanated 
from the internal setting. The external causal factors seemed tangential in that they could 




Using both first and second hand sources as well as some interviews, the thesis arguably 
has few different contributions to note. First, it applies an integrative theoretical approach 
to understand and explain the 1989 uprising as a phenomenon of conflict within the states, 
an exercise slighted by the scholarly research so far. Second, it applies the Brown 
leadership-centric and bad neighbor-centric approach to explain the uprising as an 
internal conflict.  The scholars have ignored this aspect too. Third, it makes a specific 
case of Kashmiri ethnonationalism underscoring the resurgence of their distinct separate 
Muslim identity. This aspect also figures little in the recent analysis of the problem. 
Fourth, it tries to offer a balanced treatment of both internal and external variables that 







The thesis has been organized as follows. An attempt is made to look at the brief history 
of Kashmir conflict in section II. Section III foucuses on literature review underscoring 
an integrated conceptual framework to explain and understand the 1989 uprising. Section 
IV offers the causal explanations of the uprising. Summary, conclusions, and the policy 
































And let me make it clear that it has been our policy all along that where 
there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either Dominion, the 
accession must be made by the people of that state. 
 




We will not rest until the remaining part of Kashmir is secured. We are 
being threatened with a nuclear attack. Do they understand what this 
means? If they think we will wait for them to drop a bomb and face 
destruction, they are mistaken. 
 
-Atal Behari Vajpayee, the current Indian Premier. quoted in David 
Gardne, “Clinton visit spurs tension in South Asia,”  Financial Times 
(London), Wednesday, February 9, 2000: 4. 
 
 
I have said very clearly that nuclear weapons should not be used. However, 
when our national integrity is threatened, then we will take a decision at 
that time; we will take decision when the occasion arises.  
 
- General Parveez Musharaf, the current military ruler of Pakistan. Quoted  
in David Gardne, “Clinton visit spurs tension in South Asia,”  Financial 




II. BACKGROUND OF THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 
 
 The pre-1947 Kashmir 
 
Kashmir,10 which has a long kaleidoscopic history, had been chronically subjected to 
Hindu and Buddhist rule, Muslim rule, Chaks rule (Muslim), Sikh rule, and Dogra rule 
                                                          
10 One theory maintains, Kashmir owes it name to a Semitic tribe, the Kash, who founded the cities of 
Kash , Kashan and Kashgar in Central Asia. Another theory contends that the old name of Kashmir was 
saitsaras, which means a land from which water (kra) was bought by winds (samira). Yet another account 
contends that the name Kashmir is a compound Prakrit word in which kas, meaning “channel” and mar, 




(Appendix I and Chronology). The early history of Kashmir was written in Sanskrit (later 
on in Persian) by a famous historian-poet, Kalhna who gave an account of Kashmir’s 
history from 1182 B. C. in his masterpiece Rajatarangini 11 . Kalhana writes that the 
Nagas, a tribal people worshipped serpent-deities, a practice that continued in the valley 
until the end of the sixteenth century. G. M. D. Sufi (1974) in his seminal two-volume 
work documents the socio-cultural and religious evolution of Kashmir with a focus on the 
spread of Islam in Kashmir.  
 
Kashmir, which was ruled by a host of kings belonging to different religions, went 
through a process of constant metamorphosis. The Muslim rule, which lasted for 499 
years (Sufi, 1974: xxvi; also see Appendix I, and Chronology), left an impressive 
indelible mark to the entire matrix of Kashmir’s socio-cultural and religious mosaic. The 
most authoritative accounts, which are also the predominant view, portray Kashmir as a 
nation of diversity in unity (Kalhna, 1991; Sufi, 1974). The characteristic feature that 
marks if off from other parts of modern India is that in Kashmir a Hindu visits a 
Muslim’s mazar sharif (shrine) and vice versa. Significantly, the Kashmiri pandits and 
the Muslim have the same food habit and they wear the same kind of clothes. The people 
of Ladakh (culturally more akin to the Tibetans) of Kashmir do say their prayer on Friday 
as the Muslims do. Rinchan or Rinchna, a contemporary of Edward III of England, who 
was a Hindu Ladakhi Bhuddist Prince was converted to Islam After conversion he took 
the Muslim name, Sadar-Ud-din (Sufi, 1974: 80). With him the Muslim rule in Kashmir 
began and lasted for about five hundred years without a break.  
 
                                                          
11 Kalhana’s Rajatarangini, Saga of the Kings of Kashmir, tr. R. S. Pandit (1991)  
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However, the modern history of Kashmir began with the conquest of Kashmir by the 
Great Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1586 (Chronology). With the signing of the Treaty of 
Amritsar on 15 March 1846 between Gulab Singh and the British, Kashmir became a 
possession of the former who bought it from the latter for a paultry sum of 7.5 million 
rupees (Appendix II, Article 3).12 The Hindu rule under the Dogra dynasty became well 
established with the Treaty of Amritsar. The Dogra ruled Kashmir until 1947 when the 
British India was divided into two parts and India and Pakistan emerged as two separate 
states.  
 
The post-1947 Kashmir 
 
Before the partition of British India on 14 August 1947, 564 princely states joined either 
India or Pakistan, in keeping with their geographic compulsions. Only three states, (1) 
Junagadh, (2) Hyderabad, and (3) Jammu and Kashmir joined neither India nor Pakistan. 
In these states, the rulers belonged to a religion different from that of the majority of their 
people. In Junagadh and Hyderabad the rulers were Muslim but the majority of the 
people were non-Muslims; in Jammu and Kashmir the ruler was a Hindu (named, the 
Maharaja Hari Singh, the successor of Gulab Singh) and the overwhelming majority of 
his people were Muslims (about 75 percent). Later, the percentage of the Muslims 
population went up. Table 2.1 and figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the break down of the 
population of Jammu and Kashmir by region and religion.  
 
 
                                                          
12 Two hundred thirty five thousand US dollars.  
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Table 2.1 Population of Jammu and Kashmir, 1981 
  (Figure in millions and percentage) 
Region Population  Total Muslims Hindus Others 
Kashmir Valley 3,134,904 52.36 94.96  4.59  0.05 
Jammu 2,718,113 45.39 29.60 66.25  4.15 
Ladakah    134,372   2.25 46.04   2.66 51.30* 
Total 5,987,389 100 64.19 32.24   3.57 
Source: Government of India, Census of 1981. 
Note: * Buddhist; More recent data are not available 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Population of Jammu & Kashmir:      Figure 2.2 Population of Jammu &  
       Religion-wise, 1981                    Kashmir: Region-wise,  
                                                                                                      1981  












The accession issue constituted the key source of conflict between India and Pakistan, 
and they developed two rival versions of history, making Kashmir a disputed territory. 
However, when finally the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh acceded to India, some tribal 
men from Pakistan made entry into Kashmir in an attempt to foster an uprising in 
Kashmir. Hari Sing sought the assistance of India to salvage Kashmir from the imminent 
attack of the tribal people. Nehru, the first Premier of independent India was willing to 
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offer help conditionally. The condition was that Maharaja Hari Sing would require join 
India before Nehru could airlift the Indian army into Kashmir. Initially indecisive, Hari 
Singh was constrained by the turn of the events to accede to India. The heart of the 
Kashmir conflict lies in the legal validity of Hari Singh’s accession to India. Put it simply, 
for India, it was entirely legal; in contrast, to Pakistan it was not. Since then two versions 
of the history of modern Kashmir began to be portrayed by scholars (Akbar, 1985; Bazaz, 
1954; Brecher, 1949; Cohen 1994; Engineer, 1992; Ferguson, 1961; Gupta 1969; Gupta, 
1966; Hewitt, 1995; Jaisingh, 1996; Jha, 1996; Lamb; 1994; 1992, 1966; Kadian, 1993; 
Khan, 1999; Khan 1990; Khan, 1968; Korbel, 1954; Lawrence, 1985; Madohk, 1949; 
Schofield, 1996; and Wakefield, 1975).               
 
Jha’s work, Kashmir, 1947: Rival Versions of History, two important books by Lamb, 
Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, and Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Khan’s 
mini-volume, Kashmir: The Accession to India: A Fraud, Schofield’s volume, Kashmir: 
In the Crossfire, and Hewitt’s book, Reclaiming the Past?: The Search for Political and 
Cultural Unity in Contemporary Jammu and Kashmir, give fresh and updated history 
from the past to the current uprising. Jah’s analysis represents the Indian official 
viewpoint, while Lamb’s two volumes and Khan’s one uphold the Pakistani official view. 
Schofield’s work, and Hewitt’s one take no side.  
 
In A Disputed Legacy, Lamb claimed that the British government conspired with the 
Indian union-to-be to prevent Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan because it needed a 
“vantage point” from which to watch Central Asia (Lamb, 1991: 107).  The second 
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evidence of conspiracy, as Lamb contends, was the boundary commission award of three 
tehsils in Gurdaspur district13 to India, despite the district as a whole, and Pathankot 
Tehsil in particular, which had a slight Muslim majority. This made Jammu and Kashmir 
contiguous to India and fulfilled the principal requirement giving Kashmir the right of 
acceding to India. Had this not been done, Kashmir would have been cut-off from India, 
and lie the North West Frontier Province which had a Congress government elected by 
large majority in 1946, would have had no option but to accede to Pakistan.  
 
Lamb offers three more evidences to vindicate his claim. The first is letter, described by 
Lamb as “confused and emotional”, written by Krishna Menon, a close colleage of Nehru, 
to Lord Mountbatten, the last Constitutional Governor-General of the British India. In the 
letter Menon warned Mountbatten of serious consequences if Kashmir accedes to 
Pakistan. Menon feared that Mountbatten’s purpose in going to Kashmir was to persuade 
Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan in order to make it as strong as possible (Lamb, 1992: 
108). The second is a letter from Nehru to Mountbatten urging him to make Hari Singh 
see reason and release Sheikh Abdullah, whom Nehru believed to be indisputably the 
most popular leader in Kashmir, from jail. In his letter Nehru pointed out that although 
the state was 77 percent Muslim, its people would approve of accession to India because 
of their devotion to Sheikh Abdulah (Lamb, 1992: 108). Lamb’s third evidence is a note 
Mountbatten made of a communication with Ram Chandra Kak, the Dewan or Prime 
Minister of Kashmir. It was held that Mountbatten was really conveying the message that 
Kashmir would be well advised to join India as it would keep Hari Sing on his throne, 
                                                          
13 This is the only land corridor that connects India with Kashmir.  
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while Jinnah would ensure that the Maharaja’s Muslim subjects would bring about this 
overthrow.  
 
Pakistan’ version of history has become more creditable with the updated evidence that 
Lamb has furnished. By contrast, Jha attempts to refute Lamb’s analysis, and comes up 
with counter evidence mentioning the fortnightly reports of W. F. Webb, the British 
political agent in Kashmir, and after his departure on the lapse of paramountancy, by Gen. 
Scott, the commander of the state forces (Jha, 1996: 13). He makes six counter arguments 
to discredit Lamb’s arguments which Jha believes have been designed to discredit the 
Indian version of history (Jha, 1996: 11-12).  
 
Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, a state can accede to either of the dominions 
by executing an Instrument of Accession by the ruler. To Pakistan’s utter astonishment 
the Maharaja acceded to India. It appears that Indian forces were already in Kashmir 
before 26 October, whereas the Maharaja signed the instrument of accession on 29 
October. Mountbatten had signed it on 27 October. Lamb was the first to point out that 
the instrument of accession was postdated, as the Indian army was already in Kashmir  







 The 1965 India-Pakistan War: Why did not the uprising break out then? 
 
Kashmir was given a special status under the Indian Constitution (Appendix III). The 
provisions for the special status were laid down in the Article 370 of the Indian 
Constitution (Appendix IV). Nehru promised to materialize those provisions. In reality, 
Indian began to act contrary to its declared arrangements just playing on a different tune 
and becoming authoritarian in its dealings with Kashmir. In 1953 Nehru dismissed 
Sheikh Abdullah from his Premiership of Kashmir only to silence his voice for long 
twenty-two years. Nehru, who was pledged-bound to hold plebiscite, could not fulfill his 
promise owing to the anti-forces that prevented him to give a try on it. By 1958 Kashmir 
began to be regarded as an integral part of India, and Nehru “lost his personal authority to 
decide India’s suzerainty over Kashmir” (Rizvi: 1995: 30).  
 
In December 26, 1963 Kashmir saw violent religious agitation on the issue of the theft of 
the repository of the moh-e-moqaddas (a hair of the Prophet Mohammed (SM)) from the 
Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar. It caused religious protests and demonstrations both in 
Kashmir and Pakistan (Rizvi, 1993: 50) A qualitatively significant change was effected in 
1963 following the replacement of the Article 370 with the Articles 357 and 365 of the 
Indian Constitution (to be discussed in detail in Section IV). The change gave India all 
power to decide the fate of Kashmir. This generated severe political agitation both in 
Kashmir and in Pakistan, as discussed in Section IV. Suffice it to say here, India, 
oblivious of all democratic norms and ignoring its past commitments to the Kashmiri 
people, assumed an all-powerful imperialist role in integrating Kashmir to India. Pakistan, 
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which was always sympathetic to the Kahsmiri Muslims, took the religious agitation in 
Kashmir as signs of pro-Pakistani sentiment (Ganguly, 1992: 205). In 1964 Nehru died. It 
created a leadership vacuum. In April 1965, India, in the battle of the Rann of Kutch with 
Pakistan, could not fare well, which embolden the Pakistani President, General Ayub 
Khan to show the Pakistani military prowess further by way of carrying out more military 
offensives against India. Meanwhile, in 1954 Pakistan became the member of South East 
Asian Treaty organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Treaty later came to be known as 
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Such developments brought the Cold War 
right near the door of the region raising the Indian eyebrow (Rizvi, 1993: 55; Ahmed, 
1985: 30). In early August the second phase of the “Operation Gibraltar” 14  began. 
Pakistan’s assumptions for the operation were based on the following strategic 
calculations: i) that widespread support existed in Indian-held Kashmir for waging a 
guerrilla campaign; (ii) that India would not be inclined to launch a large-scale military 
offensive against Pakistani-held Azad Kashmir; and (iii) that India would not cross the 
international frontier in either the East or in West Pakistan (Khan, 1979 referred to in 
Rahman, 1996: 110). The freedom fighters began intervening in the worsening situation 
in Kashmir. Guerrilla activities, sabotage, and ambushes were daily occurrences in 
Indian-occupied Kashmir by August 1965 (Rahman, 1996: 110). But the uprising could 
not blossom in full. Why?          
 
The answer has to be sought both from internal and external developments that were 
prevalent at that time in Kashmir and around the world. Internally there was an absence 
of ethnic and political mobilization in Kashmir. In addition, there was also an absence of 
                                                          
14 For the background of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, see (Khan, 1979).  
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leaderhip. Abdullah, the leader was totally cut to size, and he was out of political office 
for twenty-two years. The Bakshi government that was installed by India  following the 
dismissal of Abudullah government was loyal to the New Delhi government. The Bakshi 
government did not favor the uprising, but rather rebuffed it. Most important, this 
generation of Kashmir was politically inactive and unconscious (Ganguly, 1992: 206). As 
this generation of Kashmiri had neither the access to media nor had the high rate of 
education and literacy, they were not politically conscious about their rights and 
privileges. Furthermore, they had long-history of maintaining a composite identity: 
Kashmiriyat, a factor that was still holding them together.  
 
Another key internal factor was the absence of the rise of Hindu religious extremism 
under the leadership of the Hindu nationalist party, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 
1980s. It was wholly a new phenomenon in its current form, a phenomenon that has 
polarized Muslim-Hindu relationship in the early 1980s, and caused the Indian Muslims 
to reassert their own collective identity. In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, it was 
rather secularism that was the guiding force and principle both in the Center and Kashmir.  
 
Seen from the external perspective, there was absence of religious reawakening and 
social movements during that period. As Tessler and Nachtwey, in their 1998 work, 
“Islam and Attidues Towards International Conflict,” argue, “defying all expections of 
modernization theory, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a reawakening of religious ideas 
and social movements” (Tessler and Nachtwey, 1998: 619). It was during this time that 
secularism became a weakening force in India as Nehur’s Congress party began to lose 
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parliamentary majoritarianism in India (Lustick, 1997: 88-117). During this time, 
excepting the weak and unorganized support of Pakistan, there was no instance of the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 to draw a parallel. Also, there was no instance of Afghan 
resistance movements that drove a mighty superpower, the Soviet Union, from 
Afghanistan, no instance of the rise of ethno-religious based conflicts in the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, no instance of Palestinian independent state, and the like. 
As Tessler and Nachtwey contend: “The findings from . . . various studies suggest that 
religious orientations do play an important role in shaping political attitudes, . . . . . 
Furthermore, more often than not, they suggest that religiosity pushes toward a more 
conservative and nationalistic view of politics and international relations” (Tessler and 
Nachtwey, 1998: 623). As the Islamic resurgence movement of a current type was a post-
Cold War phenemenon, such an element was visibly absent in Kashmir. Thus, neither the 
internal nor the external dynamics were favorable to go for a full-scale armed uprising by 
challenging the Indian authority over Kashmir. Consequently, despite the rising 
discontents among the Kashmiris for the Center’s betrayal to their causes and the support 
from Pakistan, they deemed that time was not ripe for such an uprising.  
 
Also, the fact that all the assumptions (noted above) on the basis of which Pakistan flexed 
its muscles proved wrong had its negative implications on the entire course of events. As 
New Delhi rather launched a full-scale military offensive against Pakistan (Pakistan lacks 
strategic depth) much to the contrary to the Pakistani strategic calculations, Islamabad 
became more concerned about its own internal security. Islamabad realized that to keep 
supporting the uprising movements might probe self-defeating when the fire kept fanning 
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its flames on its own house. These all explain why Kashmiris did not proceed with the 
uprising plan, and consequently it was nipped in the bud.  
 
However, the war brought to an end with the active intervention of the Soviet Union, and 
in Tashkent both India and Pakistan met each other to sign the nine-point Tashkent 
Agreement (Appendix V) that would guide their future dealing of the Kashmir issue.    
 
The 1971 India-Pakistan War and its Aftermath 
 
Although the 1971 war between India and Pakistan15 was not fought on the Kashmir 
issue, it had far-reaching implications for the two. New Delhi, under the Simla 
Agreement (See Appendix VI) of 1972, compelled Pakistan to accept that henceforth the 
Kashmir conflict should be treated exclusively as the bilateral issue between them and 
therefore it should be resolved within the framework of their bilateral relations without 
any third party mediation.  
 
The 1971 war, in which Pakistan lost its eastern wing, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), 
dealt a severe blow to Jinnah’s two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan came 
into existence in 1947. This was shock-wave-one to the ruling elite of Pakistan.  Shock-
wave-two was India’s diplomatic and military victory vis-à-vis Pakistan in the war of 
1971 out of which New Delhi emerged as a dominant power in South Asia. The ruling 
elite of Pakistan was bent on revenging on India. The post-1971 war period was 
increasingly marked by proliferation of an arms race between New Delhi and Islamabad 
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(Malik, 1995; Rizvi, 1993). The crises of 1987, 1990, the 1989 uprising and  the 1999 
Kargil crisis in the aftermath of the outbreak of the uprising are the hints of Pakistan’s 
attempts to flex its muscle on the Kashmir issue (Jan, 1999: 699-719; Rashid and et al 
1999a: 18-20; 1999b: 26; Rashid, 1999: 27).  
 
 Mutual tension and distrust between New Delhi and Islamabad following the outbreak of 






























III.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 For the orignis of the 1971 India-Pakistan war, see (Ganguly, 1995) 
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K. Subrahmanyam, a hawk, and the former Defense Advisor of the Indian government 
and the former Director of Institute of Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), attributes 
the cause of the uprising to the Pakistani government’s involvement and its logistic 
supports to the Kashmiri militants (Subrahmanyam, 1990: 111-139). The current Director 
of IDSA, Air Commodore (Retd.) Jasjit Singh and the Indian scholar D. P. Kumar also 
blame Pakistan for brewing the uprising (Sing, 1992: 6; Kumar, 1992: 116-126). 16  
According to this view Pakistan had engineered the uprising by supplying the weapon to 
the militants, giving them training and by providing them sanctuary. This view argues 
that Pakistan’s involvement to the uprising could be traced back to 1988 when the 
General Zia-ul Huq, the President of Pakistan with his policy to fanning the religious 
fundamentalism in Kashmir, masterminded the “Operation Topac” to incite the militant 
movement in Kashmir. The rationale that they give is that Pakistan, after getting 
embolden morally by offering its assistance to the Afghan militants who successfully 
drove away the Soviets from Afghanistan, thought a low-intensity conflict was both 
militarily cheap and organizationally sustainable as the nuclear capacity of Pakistan and 
India had created a stand-off condition between the two (Kumar, 1996: 126-127). The 
Indian Ambassador in Seoul referring to the “Operation Topac” identified the 
Islamization process of Zia-ul Huq and the Pakistani “proxy war” in Kashmir as the key 
variable behind the uprising. In his opinion, the strategy of low-intensity conflict is both 
                                                          
16 Sing claims that more than 60 percent weapons were siphoned off by Pakistan (especially its ISI) to the 
Kashmiri militants (Singh, 1992: 6). 
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economically and militarily cheap and strategically feasible.17 However, it is argued that 
if Islamabad stops aiding the militants, the uprising will come to an end. 
 
The problem with such an explanation is that it does not offer any scholarly objective 
analysis of the uprising. It is, at best, partial explanations, and libel on the state-centric 
propaganda gimmicks. There is no denying the fact that Pakistan’s involvement is there. 
But it is simply fatuous to argue that the Kashmiris grievances are the handiwork of the 
Pakistan government. On the contrary, it is an act of the Indian government that followed 
a persistent policy of electoral fraud in Kashmir eventually leading to the institutional and 
political decay that alienated the Kashmiris. Viewed thus, explanations offered by 
Subrahmanyam and others are guilty of the sins of commission of sweeping 
generalization as it overly ignores the Indian government role by bringing the Pakistani 
involvement on the front burner in causing the uprising.  
 
On the other hand, the government of Pakistan holds that the Indian government’s 
endemic denial of the right to “self-determination” to the Kashmiri people has 
precipitated the uprising. So the uprising was “an innevitable process.”18 The Pakistani 
government’s view has been reflected in the work published by the Pakistan government-
sponsored Islamabad-based strategic think tank. According to that work: “The current 
                                                          
17  Interview with the Indian Ambassador, 25 February, Seoul, 2000. The Ambassador, however, 
acknowledged that the uprising has its domestic roots too. Furthermore, while it is generally held that a full 
length article on the “Operation Topac” was published in the Indian prestigious Indian defence journal, 
Indian Defence Review (July 1989 issue), the Indian Ambassador told me that it was first published in the 
Pakistani paper. It should be mentioned here that the whole plan of  “Operation Topac” was a “fraud” and 
“concocted” analyses offered by the Indian analysts as a “hypothetical case” – a fact that K. 
Subrahmanyam later acknowledged. (See, Desmond, 1995: 8). The US-based Indian scholar Ganguly too 
has highlighted this point in a similar vein (See Ganguly, 1992: footnote 2: 15). 
18 Interview with the Pakistani Ambassado, 24 February 2000.  
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uprising in Kashmir is the outcome of multiple factors. These include historical betrayals, 
constitutional despotism, negation of socio-cultural identity, religious discrimination, 
economic deprivation, and state repression, besides 43 years of misrule and manipulation 
by Delhi” (Akhtar, 1991: 48).19  
 
Such explanations suffer from the same problems as those of Subrahmayam’s. First, 
Akhtar simply slights the Pakistani involvement with and support for the uprising, which 
is believed to be real. Second, her analysis suffers from coherence in that she does not 
account for the relative weight that ought to be given to the particular factors that led to 
the uprising. Third, her claim of “religious discrimination” as a cause for the uprising is a 
little exaggeration in that the Indian government did not purse a persistent policy of 
religious discrimination in Kashmir, for that going to be an anathema for its declared 
principle of secularism. Seen thus, such explanations are incomplete, and offer little 
systematic causal explanations of the uprising.  
 
Rahman, a Pakistani and a professor of Cultural Geography at Iowa University, America, 
has argued in the similar vein of Akhtar’s. He identifies the denial of the right to the self-
determination, “ineffective administration”, and “political manipulation” by authorities in 
India and the state of Jammu and Kashmir as the factors behind the uprising that has 
assumed “the shape of a classic liberation struggle” (Rahman, 1996: 149). Lamb, the 
distinguished British historian, offers a detailed historical discourse and identifies the 
Indian government’s illegitimate accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 and its consistent 
denial of the right to self-determination as the contributing factors behind the uprising 
                                                          
19 See, Shaheen Akhtar, Uprising in Indian-HeldKashmir,op.cit., 
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(Lamb, 1992; 1994). His analysis almost follows suit of Akhtar’s. These explanations, 
(Lamb’s discourse is more rich and comprehensive than that of the Rahman’s) which are, 
first of all, are not causal explanations, have more or less same problems as pointed out in 
the preceding discussion. 
 
Two works, one by a British political scientist, Vernon Hewitt and the other by a U.S.-
bsed Indian medical practitioner, Rajesh Kadian, have given a historical discourse of the 
uprising. Arguing that “the causes of the crisis remain the same”, Hewitt takes a political, 
socio-economic approach. He then solicits the roots of the origins of the uprising in the 
“extraordinary degree of political manipulation and central intervention”, the 
“disinterested political elite, lacking the skills and sensitivities needed to manage 
complex constitutional arrangements” of Kashmir (Hewitt, 1995: 9). To Kadian, the roots 
of the uprising ought to be solicited in the wrongdoing of the Farooq Abdullah 
government, Islamic fundamentalist sentiment, and Pakistan interference in the politics of 
Kashmiri state (Kadian: 1993: 12-20). 
 
Compared to Kadian’s, Hewitt’s work is methodical and more refreshing. Their pieces 
are grounded in historical analysis. While Kadian’s is more concerned with the strategic 
issues and options for Pakistan and India in the absence of the resolution of the conflict, 
Hewitt’s is concerned with the ethnic composition (which is very important to understand 
the problem) of Jammu and Kashmir. Yet none of them offers systematic causal 
explanations of the phenomenon (Hewitt tries so more than Kadian’s); none treats the 
timing dimension of the problem.  
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It is worth bearing in mind that the views that the Indian government’s repression and 
betrayal have alienated the Kashmiri eventually causing the uprising have been shared by 
many other scholars, be they Pakistani, Indian, and Westerners (Desmond, 1995: 5-16; 
Fernandes, 1992; Newberg, 1995; Rizvi, 1995, 1993; 1992).20  
 
Fernandes, the former minister of Kashmir and currently the Indian defense minister 
attributed the current uprising to three causes. They are: (i) all-pervasive corruption; (ii) 
the failure of the government to alleviate economic problems, and (iii) the contrived and 
fruitless election process that the population has experienced in Kashmir (Fernandes, 
1992: 288). Dr. Newberg, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, argues: “The 
Indian government’s interference in Kashmiri politics in the name of India’s nationalism 
and federalism—both quite distant for Kashmiris—has taken its toll. The absence of 
democracy in Kashmir itself and in its dealings with New Delhi—all in the cause of an 
Indian security and subcontinental status quo in which the Kashmiris have never felt fully 
part—have sadly turned dissatisfaction into insurrection” (Newberg, 1996: 2).  Rizvi, 
who taught for a long time at Nuffield College at Oxford, and Warwick University, and is 
currently the Director of Contemporary Affairs, The Asia Society, a prestigious New 
York-based think-tank, made the following observation. “It (uprising) is a genuine mass 
uprising resulting from socio-economic neglect and, more importantly, from a 
                                                          
20 An exception is Hari’s work.He maintains that it is rather too much concessions given by the Indian 




commitment among the youth to secure an autonomous Kashmir, independent of both 
India and Pakistan. . . . The uprising in Kashmir  . . . is inspired by a desire to overthrow 
the existing order”(emphasis added Rizvi, 1993: 80-81; 1992: 34).  
 
Another Indian scholar, Dutta, identifies the following factors responsible for the uprising 
in Kashmir (also she includes Punjab and the states of the northeast): rising economic 
aspirations, perception of a threat to their political, economic and cultural interests, a 
communication gap between the central government and the people of these states, and 
loss of faith in the central government’s ability and willingness to solve regional 
problems (Dutta, 1998: 431). The root of Kashmir’s alienation, as Hari Om, a specialist 
on Kashmir, pointed out recently, lies in “misrule, bureaucratic bungling and the 
suppression of the legitimate expression of popular will.”21 
 
Problems with these shades of explanations are threefold. First, they are mostly 
atheoretical, historical, itemized, and journalistic accounts of the uprising. None of them 
attempts in-depth systematic causal explanations putting the uprising in a conceptual 
framework, let alone, an integrated theoretical framework. Second, they largely fail to 
address the time-dimension of the origin of the uprising. Third, they are, at times, tinged 
and laced with emotive feelings.  
 
Ganguly has recently offered causal explanation of the uprising (Ganguly, 1997; 1996-
97; 1992a; 1992b). His explanation has much merit. He gives it a scholarly treatment 




putting it in a theoretical framework. He has explained the uprising both in terms of 
underlying causes and proximate causes. While characteristically pedantic and sermonic 
in formulation of his explanations claiming that they are the best ones, his analysis has 
also its problems. First, Ganguly’s analysis does not take into account the 
ethnonationalism factor. But it constitutes a powerful explanation of ethnic conflicts 
around the globe, and not to speak of the Kashmiri case. Conversely, although he offers a 
theoretical explanation, he fails to take an integrated theoretical framework to explain the 
uprising, Second, he slights away the theory of relative deprivation. He seems to have 
assumed that relative deprivation has its economic component merely. His dismissal of 
economic factor as one of the contributing factors behind the uprising calls for 
reexamination as he comes with a very little evidences in his favor. Third, he ignores the 
extra-regional factors that acted as the “diffusion” effect of the uprising. Fourth, he 
identifies only two independent variables as the underlying causes of the uprising, and 
what he identified as the underlying causes, could well be identified as the triggering or 
proximate causes. Fifth, he maintains a studied silence as to the causal flows, meaning 
Ganguly does not say whether the causal direction of the uprising is unidirectional or 
bidirectional. 
 
The necessity of an integrated approach 
 
An integrated approach has been used to study the subject. This integrated approach 
entails the following: ethnonationalism approach; relative deprivation approach;  
international demonstration effect approach; and  leadership-centric approach.  
                                                                                                                                                                             




Nonneorealists and others who do not apply the international theories such as “security 
dilemma” offer an alternative explanation of the causes of internal conflicts. They 
identify the key factors such as “identity” “ethnonationalism”, “social structure”, and 
“self-determinism” as the underlying causes of internal conflicts (Anderson, 1968; Smith, 
1991, 1986, 1981; Connor, 1997; 1978, 1973, 1967; Hewitt, 1977; Horowitz, 1977, 1966; 
Nelson, 1994; Easman, 1994; Heisler, 1977; Punjabi, 1992; Puri, 1995: 55-64; Weiner, 
1994; 1993: 317-333; Varshney, 1998, 1992; Yinger, 1994; Zalewski and Enloe, 1996). 
While adopting the approach of identity and enthnonationalism, some of these work 
particularly underscoring the emotional and psychological dimensions of enhnonational 
identity.  
 
The central problem that ethnonationalism poses centers on the point of loyalty versus 
disloyalty. As Walker Conner cogently puts:   
 
Questions of accommodating ethnonational heterogeneity within a single state 
revolve about [sic] two loyalties—loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the state—
and the relative strength of the two. The great number of bloody separatist 
movements that have occurred in the past two decades within the first, second, 
and third world bear ample testimony that when the two loyalties are seen as 
being in irreconcilable conflict, loyalty to the state loses out. But the two need not 
be so perceived (Conner, 1987: 213 emphasis added). 
 
The problem that has been identified by Conner is more acute in a plural society like 
India where one witnesses the rise of the extreme Hinduism with the decline of the 
secular Congress Party in the early 1970s.. 
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Milton J. Yinger, the living leading authority on the subject of ethnicity, encapsulates the 
problem of India in the following way,  “The threat to India as a multi-ethnic, multi-
religious state is most easily seen in the Muslim-Hindu conflicts, especially the rise of 
Hindu nationalism in several settings and Muslim nationalism in Kashmir” (emphasis 
added Yinger, 1994: 284).  
 
Puri, an Indian distinguished scholar and the author of six books on Kashmir, offers the 
following explanation in relation to the Kashmiriyat nationalism. He argues: (Puri, 1995: 
27-47; 1993) 
 
“Why were they (Kashmiris) alienated from the Indian mainstream from 
1953 to 1975? Yet why did they not respond to Pak-sponsored liberation 
attempts during the period? Why were they again reconciled to remaining 
a part of India from 1975, following the Indira-Abdullah Accord, to say, 
1987? Why did a sudden insurgency overtake the valley a little later? Why 
have non-Kashmiri Muslims of the Indian part of the state not joined the 
ongoing insurgency? Why, despite the dependence on arms supply from, 
as also the political, moral and diplomatic support of Pakistan, is the 
rallying slogan of insurgent Kashmir ‘azadi’-freedom—and ‘Pakistan’? 
The only way this zig-zagging of Kashmir politics can be explained is in 
terms of the assertion of the Kashmiri identity. The Kashmiri Muslims 
have reacted against the threat perceived by them to their identity from 
diverse directions. They do react like any other Muslim community when 
their religious interests are endangered (Puri, 1992: 56).     
 
Punjabi views that the roots of the causes of the Kashmiri uprising in the breakdown of a 
composite Kashmiri cultural identity (Punjabi, 1992). Others of the same school view it 
as because of the conflict between the incompatible nationalist visions (Varshney, 1998; 
1992). Punjabi’s central argument is that the Indian government’s bad policy to sustain 
unpopular government in Kashmir against the democratic consent of the Kashmiris 
alienated the Muslims population of the valley leading to the break down of the common 
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traditional bond that held Hindus and Muslims under a common umbrella of 
ethnonationalism. Such a policy on the part of the Indian government contributed to 
Kashmiri Muslims to underscore their religious identity, which is one facet of Kashmiri 
ethnic identity. Varshney accounts the causes of the uprising in competing claims of three 
variants of nationalism: religious, secular, and ethnic. To him, all three versions of 
nationalism were compromised, in South Asia in general and Kashmir in particular, in the 
name of nation-building and political expediency.  
 
Relative deprivation approach 
 
A characteristic feature of a vast number of studies on the ethnic conflict is that it hinges 
on the theory of “relative deprivation”. That, in turn, is heavily loaded with the concept of 
income inequality (e.g., Muller and Seligson, 1987: 425-51; Sigleman and Simpson, 
1977: 105-28; Weede, 1998: 693-54 in Dudely and Miller, 1998: 77-96).22 Some employ 
a composite measure of grievances based on economic grievances, social grievances, and 
political rights and do not find any direct causal link between measures of relative 
deprivation and ethnic conflict (e.g., Gurr and Mooe, 1997; Lindstrom and Moor, 1995 in 
Dudely and Miller, 1998)23. In contrast to them, Dudley and Miller indicate a pronounced 
effect of political autonomy grievances and political rights grievances on the occurrence 
and severity of ethnic conflict (Dudley and Miller, 1998: 77-96). 
 
                                                          
22 There are few exceptions such as Gurr and Moore, Gurr, and Lindstrom and Moor.  
23  Their work revealed the indirect effect. 
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Ted Gurr has mainly popularized the theory of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1993a; 1993b; 
1970; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Gurr and Scarritt, 1989, 375-405 in Dudely and Miller, 
1998.). Relative deprivation, as defined by Gurr (1970: 24 in Dudely and Miller, 1998: 
80), is a group’s “perception of [the] discrepancy between . . . [its] value expectations 
and . . . [its] value capabilities.” Put it differently, it is the difference between what a 
group believes it should receive and what it believes it will receive. One of the most 
commonly used indicators of relative deprivation is income inequality.  
 
According to Gurr (1993a: 9 in Dudley and Miller, 1998: 81), “it should be obvious that 
state response to communal grievances are crucial in shaping the course and outcomes of 
minority conflicts.” The degree to which a state prevents disadvantaged groups from 
expressing their interests and participating in the selection of leaders have often been 
hypothesized to influence the propensity of groups to rebel. By far the most common 
specification of this hypothesis is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
repressiveness of the regime and domestic political violence (Gurr, 1970: 237 in Dudley 
and Miller, 1998: 88). 
 
Punjabi, Akhter, and Hewitt have looked at the economic deprivation of the Kashmiris as 
the cause of the uprising. They have solicited the causes of the current uprising in its 
socio-economic roots (Akhater, 1991; Hewitt, 1995; Punjabi, 1995: 39-54). As Hewitt 
maintains: “The sheer waste and mismanagement of Jammu and Kashmir’s development 
outlays have ensured a high degree of unemployment, especially among young literate 
men. Coupled with a degree of political cynicism, the economic hardship of the Valley 
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has been one of the contributory factors behind the rise of militancy in the early 1990s” 
(emphasis added, Hewitt, 1995: 9). 
 
International demonstration effect approach  
 
In the case of group rebellion, the diffusion of conflict can occur for a number of reasons. 
For example, a group may mobilize to support the rebellion of kindred group either 
within that state or in an adjoining state. As an evidence of this, Gurr (1993a: 133) points 
to “generations of Kurdish leaders and fighters in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran [that] have 
sustained one another’s political movements.” Diffusion of conflict may also occur 
because one or more groups believe that the chaos and confusion caused by an ongoing 
rebellion or civil war represent an opportunity to pursue their own interests (Gurr 1993a: 
133 in Dudely and Miller 1998). Hill and Rothchild (1986: 719-720 in Dudely and Miller, 
1998) hypothesize that political conflict by one group can serve as an educational tool for 
other groups: “demonstrations, protests, economic boycotts, and the like are very visible 
political tools that can be easily copied by others for their own purposes.” In their study 
of the diffusion of political conflict in Africa and the world, Hill and Rothchild found that 
conflict was more likely to diffuse to states with a “recent history of domestic strife,” and 
in countries “where the mass media come under central political controls, a greater level 
of media development will slow the spread of conflict by offering political elite an 
important means by which to control the information available about outside discord” (p. 
733 in Dudley and Miller, 1998: 92). Similarly, a recent study by Lindstrom and Moor 
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(1995: 180 in Dudely and Miller, 1998) found that “protest and rebellion . . . in 
neighboring countries influences mobilization and rebellion by ethnic groups.”  
 
In the context of the Kashmiri uprising the effect of the international demonstration has 




Miachel E. Brown has made an in-depth examination of the causes of internal conflicts 
by taking account a broad spectrum of existing literature on the subject, and then comes 
up with his own analysis on the topic (Brown, 1996, 1-32 and 571-602; 1996-1997, 3-25). 
Brown points out that according to the existing literature on the subject one may identify 
four key clusters of factors that explain the causes of internal conflict within states. They 
are: 1. Structural factor, 2. Political factors, 3. Economic/social factor, 4. 
Cultural/Perceptual factor. He lists three main structural factors, four political factors, 
three economic/social factors, and two cultural/perceptual factors that the existing 












Table 3.1 The Underlying Causes of Internal Conflict 
Structural Factors                                             Economic/Social Factors  
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Weak states Economic problems 
Intra-state security concerns Discriminatory economic systems 
Ethnic geography Economic development and modernization 
 
Political Factors  
 
Cultural/Perceptual Factors  
Discriminatory political institutions Patterns of cultural discrimination 
Exclusionary national ideologies Problematic group histories 
Inter-group politics  
Elite politics  
 
Source: Michael E Brown.,The International Dimension of Internal Conflict (ed.) Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge: 
Massachusetts, 1996): p. 14 
 
 
However, upon critical scrutiny, Brown notes three strengths and three weaknesses in the 
existing scholarly literature that explains the causes of internal conflicts. To fill the gap, 
of the weaknesses, as an alternative he chiefly offers a leader-centric, but also a neighbor-
centric approach to explain the causes of internal conflicts.  
 
 
The existing literature, asserts Brown, offers “a well-rounded set of twelve” structural, 
political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual factors that cause internal conflict. He 
further contends that “if we assume that each of these twelve underlying factors can play 
a more catalytic role if rapid changes take place in the area in question, then we also have 
a list of twelve possible proximate causes of internal conflict” (Brown, 1996: 576).  See 







                      
Table 3.2 The Underlying and Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict 
 








Weak-states Collapsing states 
Intra-state security concerns Changing inter-state military balances 





Discriminatory political institutions Political transitions 
Exclusionary national ideologies Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies 
Inter-group politics Growing inter-group competitions 
Elite politics Intensifying leadership struggles 
 
Economic/Social Factors 
Economic/Social Factors  
Economic problems Mounting economic problems 
Discriminatory economic systems Growing economic inequities 





Patterns of cultural discrimination Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination 
Problematic group histories Ethnic basing and propagandizing 
 
Source: Michael E Brown.,The International Dimension of Internal Conflict (ed.) Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge: 
Massachusetts, 1996):  577 
 
 
Brown then argues that internal conflicts may be categorized according to whether they 
are triggered by elite-level or mass-level factors, and whether they are caused by internal 
or external developments. On that basis he identifies four main types of internal conflicts, 
which, he argues, could be “depicted in a two-by-two matrix” (Brown, 1996: 579, 1996-
97: 15). See Table 3.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3 The Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict         
   Internally-driven Externally-driven 
 
 
Elite-triggered   Bad leaders Bad neighbors 
 
 




Source: Michael E Brown.,The International Dimension of Internal Conflict (ed.) Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge: 




Brown’s approach offers a better methodology to understand and explain the causes of 
internal conflicts in that he isolates one factor from another to determine why internal 
conflict flare-up in a particular country, while not in another. One important case that has 
a direct bearing on the current study is his identification of the uprising in Kashmir 
(Brown uses the word “insurgency”) as mass-triggered internal conflict. One may, on the 
contrary, argue that the Kashmir uprising is mainly elite-triggered in that it 
predominantly has its elite-content in it.        
 
Against the backdrop of the preceding literature review, the research problems have been 
addressed from an integrated theoretical framework discussed by stressing the Brown’s 
leadership-centric approach. A set of thirteen independent variables has been identified to 
explain the phenomenon. They have been classified into two broad categories: 
underlyinge causes and triggering causes. Both underlying causes and triggering causes 
have again been classified into the internal versus external sources of the origins of the 
causes. Three key independent variables: (i) the “bad policy” of the Indian ruling elite; 
(ii) the relative deprivation; and (iii) the rise of ethnonationalism have been identified as 
the underlying causes of the uprising. Of the three, the first two emanated from the 
internal setting while the third one stemmed from both internal and external settings 
(“diffusion” effect). The triggering causes stemming from the internal setting are as 
follows: (i) ethnic/political mobilization; (ii) institutional and political decay; (iii) Rajiv-
Farooq electoral alliance of 1985; (iv) the electoral wrongdoing in the 1987 elections, and 
(v) the electoral fraud in the 1989 Lok Sobha (Lower Assembly) elections. Of the five, 
the first two are the key triggering causes, while the last three proved to be the most-
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immediate “catalyst” triggering factors in causing the uprising. The triggering causes, 
(diffusion effects), which have emanated from the external setting, are as follows: (i) the 
1979 Iranian Revolution; (ii) the Soviet Afghanistan fiasco; (iii) the rise of the Palestinian 
Intifada and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; (iv) the resurgence of 
ethnic-based uprising in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; and (v) the Pakistani 
support for the uprising (“bad neighbor’s” policy?). Table 3.4 shows the causal factors of 
the uprising in Kashmir..  
 
Table 3. 4 Causal factors of the Uprising in Kashmir 
 
Underlying causes emanating from the 
internal setting  
  
Triggering  causes emanating from the internal 
setting  
 
Bad policy of the Indian ruling  elite 
 
Ethnic/political mobilization 
Relative deprivation   Institutional/political decay 
Ethnonationalism Most-immediate triggering causes emanating 
from the internal setting 
 Rajive-Farooq electoral alliance of 1985  
 The electoral wrongdoing in the 1987 elections 
 The electoral fraud in the 1989 Lok Sobha 
(Lower Assembly) 
 
 Triggering causes emanating from the external 
setting 
  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution 
 The Soviet Afghanistan fiasco 
 The rise of the Palestinian Intifada and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state 
 The resurgence of ethnic-based uprising in the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia  






Fifty years of failed bilateralism has proved that India and Pakistan are no 
in a position to solve the issue without the consent of the Kashmiri people. 
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-Omar Farooq Schofield’s interview with Mirwaiz Omar Farooq the 
leader of Kashmiri militant, London, 9 November 1995 as quoted in 
Victoria Schofield, Kashmir: In the Crossfire (London: I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, 1996): 285. 
 
They have no love for the Kashmiris, only for the land. 
 
- Kashmiri Militant, April 1995 as quoted in Victoria Schofield, Kashmir: 
In the Crossfire: 285     
 
 
Kashmiris came to insurgency when all politics seemed to fail—the 
politics of Kashmir’s traditional politicians, politics between Srinagar and 
Delhi, and politics between India and Pakistan. They view themselves as 
victims of profound corruptions that sully the meaning of politics.    
 
-Paula R. Newberg, Double Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in 
Kashmir, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 




IV. EXPLAINING THE KASHMIRI MUSLIMS’ UPRISING OF 1989 
 
 
The above quotations show that Kashmiri nationalism has come to play an increasing role 
in wakening the Kashmiris about their rights and position in national politics—a factor 
that has been fueled by the Indian ruling elite bad policy as evident from Newberg’s 






A. Underlying causes: stemming from the internal setting  
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i. Bad policies of the Indian elite 
 
To explain the 1989 uprising one needs to examine very closely and carefully the politics 
of both Center (New Delhi) and the State (Kashmir). For the purpose of the current thesis 
three distinct periods of politics has been examined. During these three distinct periods 
the ruling elite of India pursued an integration policy toward Kashmir by denying to the 
Kashmiris their right to seff-determination. In their pursuance of the integrationist policy 
they resorted to bad policy. This alienated the Kashmiris. The following periods will be 
discussed: the period of 1947-74; the period of 1974-1982, and the period of 1982-1990. 
 
a. The Period of 1947-1974 
 
Right from the beginning, Kashmir was a very sensitive and special case in the Indian 
political history. Kashmir was given a “special status”, and it was ruled by the Article of 
370 of the Indian Constitution (for details see Appendix IV). A clear understanding of the 
Instrument of Accession of 1947 is necessary in that it formulated the basis of Jammu 
and Kashmir’s future relations with India. Kashmir is a unique case, for it was accorded a 
special status that was not accorded to other former Princely states. From the legal 
perspective India’s authority remained confined to external affairs, defense, and 
communication of Kashmir (see Appendix III). It was assumed that the issue of accession 
would be finally decided in accordance with the will of the Kashmiris. The Instrument of 
Accession specified a number of safeguards to his sovereignty: 
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Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to 
acceptance of any future constitution of India . . .(Clause 7, see Appendix III) 
 
Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over 
this state . . . (Clause 8, see Appendix III) 
    
For many reasons Sheikh Abdullah was the logical choice for Nehru who did not have 
any hesitation to make Abdullah the chief minister of Kashmir. Abdullah’s first political 
role in government of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was as head of the Emergency 
Administration. After assuming the Premiership of Kashmir under Nehru’s government, 
Sheikh Abdullah kept pursuing his “New Kashmir” policy. From the very beginning, 
Abdullah, despite his loyalty to India, subscribed to the view of  “third option”, meaning 
independence (Schofield, 1996: 169; Rizvi, 1993: 88). While visiting the United States as 
one of India’s representative at the UN in January, 1948, this attitude of Abdullah got 
exposed when he privately spoke of his mind about third alternative to Warren Austin, 
the US representative at the UN (Schofield, 1996: 169).  
 
The very confining nature of the 1947 Instrument of Accession presupposed that a new 
agreement must be made if total integration of Kashmir into the lap of India should 
become a reality. In the absence of it, Kashmir cannot but have one status and that is: 
“special status”. The problem surfaced when India planned to integrate Kashmir denying 
its right to self-determination. New Delhi’s design instantly met with disapproval by 
 45
Abdullah who made it clear to Nehru that India had no right to extend its jurisdiction in 
Kashmir beyond the three areas agreed in the Instrument of Accession, that is, foreign 
affairs, defense, and communication (see Appendix III). This special status, which was 
broached as an article in the Indian Constitution, drafted first as article 306-A and later on 
finalized as article 307. “This article” said N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who moved the 
article in India’s Constituent Assembly in October 1949, “proposes a special status for 
Kashmir because of its special circumstances. The State is not in a position to merge with 
India. We will hope that in future the State of Jammu and Kashmir will get over the 
hurdles and completely merge with the Union, like the rest of the states” (Quoted in 
Schofield, 1996: 170). In the final revised draft, the clause relating to the Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles was omitted. “Little did the state leaders realize that they 
had vested the government in the State with unrestricted authority, and whoever had the 
government in hand, would assume dictatorial powers and powers which could be 
operated absolutely” (Quoted in Schofield, 1996: 171). From an Indian perspective, 
another unsatisfactory feature of Kashmir’s relations with the Union of India was its 
initial economic isolation, effected through tariff barriers which provided much needed 
revenue at the expense of economic progress (Schofield, 1996: 171).  
 
Included in Article 370 was the provision for Constituent Assembly with 100 seats, a 
quarter of which was reserved for representatives from the part of the state retained by 
Pakistan. In 1951 Kashmir’s first post-independence elections were held in which Sheik 
Abdullah and the National Conference won seventy-five unopposed seats, chiefly 
because the elections was boycotted by the Praja Parisad (171). In July 1952, Abdullah 
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succeeded in reaching a consensus with the government in New Delhi on a number of 
issues that came to be known as the Delhi Agreement. Article 370 was accepted; Kashmir 
was to be allowed its own flag, but the Indian flag would be supreme; Kashmiris would 
be citizens of India; the President of India, would be the head of state of the whole of 
India, including Kashmir; the governor of Jammu and Kashmir (sadar-i-riyasat) would 
be elected by the state legislature (as oppose to nominated from New Delhi) but he could 
not assume office without the consent of the president of India (Schofield, 1996: 172). 
 
Suspicions, however, remained on both sides. “Communal elements did not like the Delhi 
agreement”, writes Abdullah. “Some newspapers went to the extent of writing that 
instead of Kashmir acceding to India, in fact, India had acceded to Kashmir” (Abdullah, 
1992: 118 as quoted in Schofiled, 1996: 172). The people of Jammu were unhappy with 
their own obvious loss of political power. “Accession of the state to India and the dawn 
of democracy for the people of Jammu as such meant transfer of power from a Jammu-
based ruler to a Kashmiri-based leadership,” observed Balraj Puri (Puri, 1993: 27). Puri 
had personally written to Nehru on the eve of the Delhi Agreement warning of the 





Throughout the early years of independence, the people of Jammu found it hard to 
reconcile themselve to government from Srinagar. “Jammu and Kashmir, which were 
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united in 1846, are not known to have been mutually well adjusted regions of the state 
they comprise,” notes Balraj Puri “The political and administration set up after 1947 was 
as conducive to regional tensions as the one it had placed.” Secessionist sentiments in the 
valley were fed by communalism in Jammu which in turn was provoked by fears aroused 
by the secessionists” (Puri, 1966: 7-8). The numerical superiority of the valley, compared 
with 45 percent in Jammu (Puri, 1981: 99). When Abdullah had first addressed the 
Hindus of Jammu in November 1947, he surprised them by his tolerance. “The man so 
far regarded as an enemy of Hindus almost hypnotised every soul in his audience, by 
calling for communal peace in the name of the Hindu Dharma, Lord Krishan and 
Gandhi” (Puri, 1966: 11). But with the passage of time, Abdullah’s reforms aggravated 
the communal tensions. Those who had been oppressed were mainly the Muslims 
peasants. Those who were affected by his revolutionary land reforms were Hindus. The 
Praja Parishad, based in Jammu, had influential supporters as well as links with other 
pro-Hindu organizations throughout India (Schofield, 1996: 173).  
 
In October 1951 orthodox Hindus launched the Jana Sangh, led by Shyma Prasad 
Mookerjee which aimed at abrogating article 370 and fully integrating Jammu and 
Kashmir into the Indian Union. The Praja Parishad saw the National Conference not 
only as a Muslim communal Party, but also a “cover for the extension of communist 
ideology (Lamb, 1992: 197). In February 1952 there was violence in the streets of Jammu 
and curfew was imposed for seventy-two hours. Alarmed by the significance of the Delhi 
Agreement, the Praja Parisad used the slogan: “One President, One Constitution, One 
Flag”. They disliked the use of the distinctive titles, sadar-i-riyasat and prime minister, 
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as opposed to those of governor and chief minister used by other states. Claiming that 
they could not tolerate Jammu and Ladakh “going to the winds” (Puri, 1966: 98), the 
Parisad leaders accused Sheikh Abdullah of preventing the merger of the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir with the Indian Union. The very critical and complex political situation that 
had been vitiating the Kashmiri politics was aptly highlighted by Gopal, the political 
biographer of Nehru in the following way:  
  
“Trapped between Abdullah and Mookerjee for the first time since 1948 Nehru 
began to feel despondent about the future of Kashmir. He could face Pakistan and 
the United Nations and even the prospect of war; but with Abdullah and 
Mookerjee working in tacit concert to divide the state on Hindu-Muslim lines, the 
problem became almost insuperably complex” ( S. Gopal, 1975: 29 as quoted in 
Rizvi, 1993: 55 Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, 1975, II,). During this time international developments shaped the history 
of Kashmir. 
 
In November 1952, the Praja Parisad leader, Prem Nath Dogra, and one of his associates 
were detained by Abdullah. In February 1953 Dr Shyma Prasad Mookerjee wrote to 
Abdullah, “you are developing a three-nation theory, the third being Kashmiris. These are 
dangerous symptoms” (Puri, 1966: 98). When Mookerjee attempted to go to Jammu , he 
was arrested at the border. His death in detention, from a heart attack, generated 
suspicions of foul play. Right wing elements never forgave the Sheikh for crushing their 
movements.  
 
The Ladaki people doubted Abdullah’s capacity. In 1949 the Buddhist Association of 
Ladaka had sent a memorandum to Nehru suggesting that Ladakah be integrated with 
Jammu in some way, either to become an Indian state in its own right or as part of east 
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Punjab totally separate from Sheikh Abdullah’s administration in Kashmir (Schofield, 
1996: 174). “There can be no doubt” writes Alastair Lamb “that the prospect of a deal 
between Sheikh Abdullah and Azad Kashmiri for what might be called an “internal 
settlement” of the Kashmir question caused great anxiety in New Delhi; and it was 
certainly a contributing factor in Sheikh Abdullah’s downfall in 1953 (Lamb, 1992: 189). 
“By 1953 Nehru and Abdullah had grown apart. Suspicions about Abdullah's true 
commitment (loyalty) to Indian had festered. Abdullah had also became disillusioned 
with India’s secularism. Although he remained opposed to the two-nation theory, 
contrary to his earlier expectation, Pakistan was proving viable and there were some 
useful comparison to be made” (Schofield, 1996: 183). His speech in Jammu in 1952 
pointed to specific areas of dissatisfaction: “I had told my people that their interests were 
safe in India, but educated unemployed Muslims look towards Pakistan, because while 
their Hindu compatriots find avenues in India open for them, the Muslims are debarred 
from getting Government service,” (Schofield, 1996: 184).  
 
He also objected to discrimination against Muslims in the central departments as well. 
“Muslims were almost entirely debarred from working in postal services. Instead of 
striving for secularism, the officers of this department did just the opposite” (Schofield, 
1996: 184). On 8 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as prime minister after 
five years in office and put under arrest. G. M. Sadiq and Bakshi Sheikh Abdullah’s 
associates since 1930s were instrumental in Abdullah’s downfall. Bakshi was sworn in as 
chief minister on 9 August 1953, who developed a special relation with Sardar Patel and 
Karan Sing from 1948-50. Abdullah was out of office for long 22 years. He returned to 
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political office in 1975 when he was seventy years old (Schofield, 1996: 185). Bakshi 
finalized the details of Kashmir’s accession to India. In 1954, the Constituent Assembly 
formally ratified the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was intended to 
legitimize the Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh in 1947. This measure was 
also meant to end all discussion of a plebiscite. On 26 January 1957, the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir approved its own Constitution, modeled along the lines of the Indian 
Constitution. In March 1957 elections were held and Bakshi was elected as Prime 
Minister of Kashmir with a majority of sixty-eight seats.  
 
The October 1964 was a turning point for the history of India, Kashmir, and for that 
matter for the subcontinent. In that year, India changed its policy announced the Article 
370 would be replace by Article 357 and 365 of the Indian Constitution. This move, 
under the new Premier, was, in essence, a complete U-turn from Nehru who dared not do 
so in his long sixteen years Primership. Article 356 allowed the Central government to 
impose the President’s Rule, and the Article 357 empowered the Parliament to confer 
upon the President the powers of the State Legislature were applied to Jammu and 
Kashmir. The same year witnessed the changes in the designations of the Head of the 
State and the Head of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir from Sadar-i-Riyasat to 
Governor and Prime Minister to Chief Minister. These changes were accompanied by a 
declaration that “the state’s inclusion in the union was complete, final and irrevocable” 
(Time, 1964: as quoted in Rahman, 1996: 106). Such changes greeted with angry reaction 
and protest in Pakistan and Kashmir. On 12 October 1964 in his meeting with Indian 
Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri, President of Pakistan Ayub Khan said that the issue of 
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Kashmir now would be “put in cold storage” for some time (Cheema, 1992: 185). On 15 
January 1965 a protest day was observed throughout Kashmir with Police of Jammu and 
Kashmir firing at the protest crowd. Sheikh Abdullah made a speech to a huge public 
gathering on that day appealing the Kashmiris “to defeat the purpose of those (Indians) 
who were trying to tighten the chain of slavery on the Muslims of Kashmir . . . You 
cannot achieve freedom by imploring anybody and in view of India’s present attitude, 
you have to think how to face her effectively” (Choudhry, 1968: 287). Consequently, 
Sheikh was arrested by the Central government, which fueled more agitation politics in 
the State of Kashmir. The Center’s integrationist policy took its roots as the two key chief 
minister of this period, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G.M. Sadiq rivals of Sheikh 
Abdullah pledged their commitment to maintaining the state of Jammu and Kashmir’s 
continued association with the Indian Union as one of its integral parts. For instance, in 
1964, Sadiq converted the ruling National Conference partly into the Indian National 
Congress Party expressed his firm intent to “join the mainstream of national political life” 
(Trembalay, 1995: 90). The sustenance of interregional harmony, an effective political 
opposition in the state, and an effective political opposition in the state were regarded as 
the factors for the successful drive of integrative politics (Tremblay, 1995: 90). On the 
other scale of the balance, Bakshi kept reviving the National Conference in 1966. In the 
1967 elections, the revived National Conference won eight seats, “capturing 18.6% of the 
popular vote. The party remained marginal and was finally dissolved in 1972 and merged 
into the Indian National Congress (Tremblay, 1995: 91). 
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Three political organizations: the Plebiscite Front, the Awami Action Committee and the 
Jamati-i-Islami dominated the Kashmiri politics. Of the three, the Plebiscite Front was 
the most influential opposition party during the first integrative period that had been 
formed by Mirza Afzal Beg in 1955 (Tremblay, 1990: 90). During the period (1957-
1974), inter-regional harmony between the valley and Jammu was possible owing to the 
successful implementation of the state’s integrationist politics. The electoral results for 
the State Legislative Assembly of 1957, 1962, 1967, and 1972 show two trends: Jammu’s 
approval of the leadership’s integrationist choices and an absence of religious cleavages. 
In the 1957 elections out of Jammu’s total 30 seats, the pro-Hindu Bharitya Jan Sanga 
contested 22 and won five, receiving 28.4% of the popular vote. Its proportion of the 
popular vote remained steady however: 24.5% in 1962, 25:9% in 1967 and 22.3% in 
1972 (Treambaly, 1995: 92). 
 
 Although there was an absence of religious cleavages that greatly helped implement the 
integrationist policy by the Center, the history of this period also witnessed sporadic 
challenges by the Kashmiri leaders. They protestes because the integrationist policy was 
implemented at the cost of the special status and the right to self-determination of 




In September 1966, Butt clashed with the Indian army during an exchange of fire in 
Kunial village, near his hometown of Handwara; a co-worker was killed as well as Indian 
army officer. As the group captain of what was called “Operation against Indian 
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Domination (OID), Butt and several others were charged with sabotage and murder. 
Detained in the women’s jail in Srinagar, Butt defended his actions in the armed struggle: 
 
I could not reconcile to the new political set-up brought about in Kashmir after 
Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal and arrest in 1955. The Sheik’s successor, Bakshi 
Ghulam Muhammad, had, much against the wishes of the average Kashmiri, 
added some more laws to the armoury of repression. Any citizen could be 
detained in prison for five years at a stroke and Bakshi’s government was under 
no obligation to inform the detainee about the grounds of detention. The helpless 
victim could be rearrested after release and detained for another term of five years 
(Quoted in Schofield, 1996: 209)  
 
.     
Amid agitation politics, Sheikh Abdullah had been released from jail in 1968. The fact 
his arrest was anti-democratic and the fact that the Center violated the true spirit of the 
Accession were well reflected by the veteran Indian politican, Jai Prakash Narain, 
Nehru’s old socialist friend and co-worker of the freedom movement. He had written to 
Mrs. Gandhi in 1966: 
 
 
We profess democracy, but rule by force in Kashmir . . . the problems exists not 
because Pakistan wants to grab Kashmir, but because there is deep and 
widespread political discontent among the people . . . Whatever be the solution, it 
has to be found within the limitations of accession. It is here that Sheikh’s role 










The centralizing and nationalizing measures taken by Mrs. Gandhi 
included: the political destruction of the state political bosses; the selection 
of the chief ministers of the Congress-dominated states by Mrs. Gandhi 
herself in consultation with her small clique of advisers; the increased use 
of President’s Rule in the states; the increased use of central police and 
intelligence forces to monitor and control regional opposition; populist, 
demagogic appeals to national categories of voters, such as the poor, the 
landless, and the minorities; and some manipulation of xenophobic and 
paranoiac nationalism against Pakistan and the American CIA (Brass, 
1992: 321-2 as quoted in Ganguly, 1997: 84).   
 
b. The Period 1975-1982  
 
1975 Kashmir Accord between Sheikh Abdullah and India’s Premier Indira Gandhi 
brought to an abrupt end of the integrationist politics of the Bakshi and Sadiq 
governments. The accord was possible because Sheikh Abdullah dropped his demand to 
revive the pre-1953 political status of Kashmir. The war of 1971 that dismembered 
Pakistan was severe blow to the “two nation” theory on whose basis Pakistan was created. 
As the Bengali Muslim  ethnic group broke away from Pakistan, which belonged to the 
same religion, Islam, Sheikh Abdullah found it ludicrous to press home the demand for 
independence of Kashmir on the basis of the religious identity. Under the 1975 Accord, 
the special status of Kashmir, as enshrined in article 370 of the Indian Constitution was 
retained. But a key change was effected: Kashmir was termed “a constituent of the Union 
of India” (see Appendix) Under the 1975 Accord it was further agreed that the pre-1953 
status of Kashmir would not be revived. The titles of sadar-i-riyasat and prime minister, 
evidence of Kashmir’s special status, would not be re-utilized. Instead, as with all other 
states they were to remain as governor and chief minister. The Indian government would 
“continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed 
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towards disclaiming questioning or disrupting the sovereignty of India or causing insult 
to the Indian flag, the national anthem and the constitution” (Varshney, 1992: 218). The 
chief minister of Congress, Syed Mir Quasim was asked to resign in favor of Sheikh 
Abdullah. Mirza Afzal Beg became a cabinet minister. 
 
Sheikh Abdullah took advantage of the new situation and advised the governor to abolish 
the assembly and hod new elections. Elections were held from 30 June to 3 July 1997. In 
the 1977 elections the National Conference secured a landslide majority in the assembly. 
No member of Congress secured a seat in the valley. In Jammu, the National Conference 
won seven seats in 1977 elections (Table 4.6) were the first fair elections in the state 
(three previous elections had been rigged) But before the 1977 elections Abdullah 
became autocratic muzzling press, persecuting people who went against him. He brought 
his wife, two sons, and his son-in-law (G.M. Shah) into politics initiating a family politics 
in Kashmir. During his rule 2000 people were jailed and 130 people were killed for 
disloyalty to him. Food subsidies (introduced in 1953) to help poor people were 
withdrawn (Hussain, 1991: 188) The pro-Pakistan Jamait-i-Islami party became his 
target. He banned its activities that are aimed at the Islamization of Kashmir society. 
Abdullah also dissolved the Plebiscite and revived the National Conference, a single 
party came to dominate the politics of Kashmir. “This had a three-fold impact on the state 
politics: it denied political space to the most extreme members of the Plebiscite Front; it 
marginalized the pro-integrationist forces of this valley that relied increasingly on the 
national parties, thereby eroding their public support, and by Jammu’s withholding of 
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support for the ruling party, it generated sharp religious regional cleavages” (Treamblay, 
1995: 94).  
 
In July 1975, at Sheikh Abdullah’s suggestion the delegates of the Plebicite Front 
unanimously decided to dissolve the party and revive the pre-1953 National Conference. 
The Awami Action Party’s pro Pakistani, Jamit-i-Islami could not compete with 
Abdullah. His long-time associates Prem Nath Bazaz described Sheikh Abdullah’s new 
administration as “democracy through intimidation and terror” (Abdullah, 1993: 768  
quoted in Schofield, 1996: 218). That the process of political and institutional decay 
became an element of Sheikh Abdullah’s administration following his return to political 
office after 22-year has been highlighted by scholars (Treamblay, 1995; Rahman, 1996; 
Ganguly, 1997). He assumed authoritarian, dictatorial and less and less intolerant to 
opposition politics bringing political decay on the front burner. His government could 
detain people up to two years without trial. In September 1978, all members of the 
Cabinet were ordered to swear a personal oath of loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah. Those, who 
refused, were expelled from the National Conference. For example Mirza Afzal Beg 
(Rahman, 1996: 140; Treamblay, 1995: 94)., As Balraj Puri maintains, “A quantum jump 
in the process of political and emotional reintegration of Kashmir with the rest of India 
took place in what have been universally acknowledged as the fairest and freest elections 
to the State Assembly in 1977” (Puri, 1981: 189). Following Abdullah’s victory in 1977 
elections, his government passed the Jammu and Kashmir Safety Ordinance, which place 
restrictions on newspapers and other publications within the state in the interests of 
security and public order most newspapers denounced the bill. The leader of the 
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opposition, Abdul Ghani Lone called it a “black law” (Bazaz, 1978: 186, as quoted in 
Ganguly, 1992: 72). A new generation of educated, politicized and more articulate 
Kashmiris and begun to emerge during his long years of political exile. As Bazaz argues: 
“Tremendous changes had taken place in and outside Jammu and Kashmir. The educated 
Muslim youth whose number multiplied several times in 30 years realized that Sheikh 
Abdullah’s inconsistent behaviour had done immense harm to the interests of the 
Kashmiris; it had thwarted their progress and deprived them of several political and 
human rights enjoyed by all the other Indians” (Bazaz, 1978: 161 quoted in Ganguly, 
1997: 73). 
 
c. The period: 1982-1990 
 
In the post-Sheikh period, the crystallization and maturation of the secessionist forces 
within the valley owed much to the politically integrative activities of the central 
government into which the post-Sheikh state leadership had unwillingly been drawn 
(Tremblay, 1995: 96). “Mrs Gandhi and her party intensified their political campaign to 
increase the party’s strength in the Kashmir region, violating the scared guiding principle 
of maintaining a delicate balance of the Kashmir and Muslim identity on the one hand 
and the regional and national identity on the other” (Tremblay, 1995: 96). The political 
and economic frameworks within which the first integrationist period had so successfully 
operated had fallen apart. Assisted by some state leadership blunders, the increased 
central intervention solidified the secessionist movement, encouraged an active mass 
participation against the Kashmiri state and India, intensified regional differences and 
 58
created a wedge between the two religious communities of the valley (Treambaly, 1995: 
96). In his first act of reconciliation with the central government, Farooq decided to refer 
the Resettlement Bill to the Supreme Court. This legislation, allowing the permanent 
settlement of the “displaced” Kashmiri population, residing in Azad Kashmir had met 
with several criticisms, particularly by the Hindu-oriented parties in Jammu. The 
Bharitya Jan Sangh had expressed its fear that this blanket offer of citizenship to the 
refugees would facilitate the entry of Pakistani spies into the Indian territory (Treambaly, 
1995: 97). The Farooq government’s referral of the bill to the Supreme Court though it 
served to allay the fears of the Jammu population, was perceived by the Kashmiris as 
denial by the new government of the legitimacy of the popularly elected new government 
of the legitimacy of the popularly elected state legislature. In their eyes, Farooq’s 
compromise with the central government questioned both Kashmiri identity and its 
autonomy within the Indian state. 
 
From 1982 until his resignation from the chief ministership in early 1990, Farooq adhered 
consistently to the theme that Kashmir was a constituent part of India and that its political 
problems are largely a product of antagonistic center-state relations, contrary to the 
legitimacy formula carefully followed by his father. Bakshi and Sadiq, two crucial 
integrationist chief ministers, had maintained the crucial political equilibrium between 
integration and Kashmir’s distinctness within the Indian polity. Farooq’s alignment with 
the regional opposition leadership quickly blurred the political boundary between 
Kashmir and the rest of India (Treambaly, 1995: 97). In 1984 the Central Congress Party 
under the leadership of Indira Gandhi succeeded in creating a rift within the legislative 
 59
independent member, withdrew support for the Farooq government. Governon Jag 
Mohan asked Farooq’s brother-in-law, G.M. Shah, to form the new government and 
prove his majority in the Assembly within one month of appointment. Shah, the leader of 
the faction of National Conference (Khalida), won a vote of confidence with the help of 
the Congress member in the legislature (Treambaly, 1995: 97-98). Lacking popular 
support for his government and owing allegiance to Mrs Gandhi, Shah began to rely on 
religious appeals to the public. For the first time in the valley, communal riots broke out. 
The Shiv Sena agitated in Jammu against Shah’s allowing Muslim civil servants to hold 
their Friday prayers outside the Jammu Secretariat. In response the town Anantnag in 
Kashmir witnessed the worst communal riots: the Kashmir Pandits’ properties were 
indiscriminately attacked, looted and burnt. Law and order collapsed fully causing the 
central government to dismiss the Shah Ministry and impose Governor’s rule (Treambaly, 
1995: 98).                 
  
ii. Relative deprivation 
 
Literature review in section III has reflected various components of relative deprivation 
despite the conceptual and empirical problems that it poses. Dudley and Miller found 
positive correlation between ethnic conflict and relative deprivation, especially between 
the political component of relative deprivation and the cause of the ethnic conflicts 
(Dudely and Miller, 1997). The problem with Ganguly’s not accounting it as a cause lies 
in his misunderstanding of the concept in its entirety. Even his claim that economically 
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Kashmir was better off help one to understand a part of the story while hiding the other 
part.   
 
The Dogra dynasty considered Jammu as their home and Kashmir as a conquered 
territory. “They established a sort of Dogra imperialism in the State in which the Dogras 
were elevated to the position of the masters and all non-Dogras communities and classes 
were given the humble places of inferior,” wrote Prem Nath Bazaz in the 1950s (Bazaz, 
1956: 127 quoted in Schofield, 1996: 63). The feeling of discrimination, under the 
Dogras, which both the Muslims and Hindus experienced, was to manifest itself in the 
next century in a series of protests against the Maharaja’s descendants. History shows 
that the alienation of the Kashmiris from their new ruler Maharaja Hari Singh was 
heightened by continuing presence of ‘outsiders’ in government service, which led to a 
movement known as ‘Kashmir for the Kashmiris’. In 1927 a law defining a ‘Hereditary 
State Subject’ was passed forbidding the employment of non-state subjects in the public 
services; they were also not allowed to purchase land. “ But to the annoyance of the 
Kashmiris, the top positions were invariably filled by people from Jammu, especially the 
ruling class of the Dogra Rajputs, who headed all the departments of the state 
administration” (Schofield, 1996:. 100).  
  
When the Kashmiri Pandits upgraded their status in government service, this further 
aggravated the plight among the Kashmiri Muslims. Abdul Suhrawardy who was a young 
boy from the rural districts aimed in the 1930s at becoming a gazetted officer in the 
Indian Civil Service observed: “As I grew up I found that the Muslims were the 
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underdogs. The Hindus were the privileged class because they belonged to the religion of 
the community of the ruler. Almost all the government officials occupying almost all the 
ranks from the lowest up to the highest were occupied by Hindus” (Quoted in Schofield, 
1995: 100). 
 
The army was also exclusively reserved for the Dogras. No Muslim in the Kashmir valley 
was allowed to carry a firearm and the only Muslims who were recruited into the army, 
normally under the command of a Dogra officer, were the Suddhans of Poonch the 
Sandans from Mirpur (Schofield, 1995: 100).       
        
The Lahore Muslim press played a key role in bringing the plight condition of the 
Muslim Kashmiris in the limelight. In 1929 Sir Albion Banerji a Bengali Christian, who 
visited Kashmir in 1927 as a senior member of the Council, resigned on the grounds that 
he no longer wished to serve under the Maharaja Hari Singh. He observed: 
 
Jammu and Kashmir State is labouring under many disadvantages, with a 
large Muhammadan population absolutely illiterate, labouring under 
poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages and 
practically governed like dumb driven cattle. There is no touch between 
the Government and the people, no suitable opportunity for representing 
grievances and the administrative machinery itself requires overhauling 
from top to bottom to bring it up to the modern conditions of efficiency. It 
has at present no sympathy with the peoples wants or grievances (Quoted 
in Schofield, 1995: 100).  
 
 
Leading Muslim newspapers in India continued to point to the progress of the Kashmiri 
Pandits at the expense of the Muslims: “They will till the land, feed the State, fill its 
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coffers, they are invariably sent to the wall and the Kashmiri Pandit is placed at the helm 
of affairs to rule them with a rod of iron,” put the Muslim Outlook in 1923 (Muslim 
Outlook, 5 May, 1923, quoted in Punjab Press Abstract, 12 May 1923 Crown 
Representatives’ Records, OIOC, as quoted in Schofield, 1996: 95) In the Spring of 1924 
the workers of the state-owned silk factory demanded an increase in wages and the 
transfer of a Hindu clerk whom the workers alleged was extorting bribes. Established in 
the late nineteenth century, the factory employed about 5,000 workers, most of whom 
were Muslims. Although the workers were given a minimal wage increase, some of their 
leaders were arrested, which led to a strike. As later reported in a representation ton the 
viceroy, Lord Reading, “Military was sent for and most inhuman treatment was meted 
out to the poor, helpless, unarmed peace loving labourers who were assaulted with spears, 
lances and other implements of warfare”. The representation, signed by the two chief 
religious leaders, submitted to the viceroy, through Mohsin Shah, also referred to other 
grievances: 
 
The Mussulmans of Kashmir are in a miserable plight today. Their 
education needs are woefully neglected. Though forming 96 per cent of 
the population, the percentage of literacy amongst them is only 0.8 per 
cent . . . So far we have patiently borne the State’s indifference towards 
our grievances and out claims and its high-handedness towards our rights, 
but patience has its limit and resignation its end . . . the Hindus of the State, 
forming merely 4 per cent of the whole population are the undisputed 
masters of all departments (Quoted in Muslims of Kashmir, OIOC, as 
quoted in Schofield, 1996: 95)          
 
The cumulative impact of this oppression is the 13 July 1931 uprising against the 
Maharaja Hari Sing, which plunged the state, noted his son Karan Sing who could not 
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become a king after Hari Sing, “into serious political turmoil, after which things were 
never again to be the same” (Schofield, 1995: 101). 
  
Sheikh Abdullah, who returned to the valley in 1930, could sense the oppression well 
ahead as he said: “How could I have known that the nation was on the brink of an 
eruption. The trampled pride and hope of the people of Kashmir was like molten lava 
ready to flow. Nature fanned the embers of protest which were smouldering inside me. It 
was left to me to take the lid off the volcano’s mouth (Quoted in Schofield, 1995: 102). 
Abdullah was jailed twice; once for three weeks and then for ten months when he was 
arrested in September 1931. His crime was that he made speeches against the injustices 
of the Maharaja’s rein. The 13 July 1931 uprising has had its spillover impacts on the rest 
of India leading Muslims to form All India Kashmir Committee to campaign for the 
redress of the Kashmiri Muslims. Under the pressure from the British resident, the 
Maharaja Hari Singh appointed a commission headed by Sir Bertrand Glancy, a senior 
office in the Political Department of the Government of India, to inquire into the 
complaints of the people. Prem Nath Bazaz and Ghulam Abbas were amongst the co-
members of the commission. In April 1932 Glancy presented his report. “It is a document 
of great historical importance,” writes Bazaz “as it established beyond doubt that real 
grievances existed which needed redress.” “The commission had recommended far-
reaching reforms for the development of education, particularly, primary education,” said 
Abdullah. “It had also suggested reforms in the appointment of governments servants, as 
well as granting proprietary rights to the cultivators of government-owned lands. In 
addition it recommended setting up industries to create employment opportunities.”  
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Glancy’s recommendation had been supplemented by the Reform Conference, which 
proposed that a legislative assembly should be set up. The legislative assembly, known as 
the Praja Sabha (Peoples assembly) was a mere eyewash. As noted Abdullah: “My 
comrades and I were fully aware that the proposed assembly was hoax, but we wanted to 
use it as a forum to demonstrate that the Muslim Conference represented the majority of 
the population of the State. It is a strange assembly! All the legislative powers were in the 
hands of the Maharaja. He could also veto any act passed by the Assembly (Schofield, 
105). While at the beginning of World War II, the rest of the Indian government and the 
Maharaja busied themselves to formulate their war-time policy, Sheikh became 
preoccupied with his plans for a “Naya Kashmir” (New Kahsmir) which was 
ideologically hedged with socialist program. At the annual session of the National 
Conference at Sopore in September 1944, the members adopted the “Naya Kashmir” 
manifesto. Abdullah promised a constitution which gave freedom, equality and 
democracy: “To perfect our union in the fullest equality and self-determination, to raise 
ourselves and our children forever from the abyss of oppression and poverty, degradation 
and superstition, from mediaeval darkness and ignorance, into the sunlit valleys of plenty 




With the opening of a University in Srinagar in 1949, and free education, a new 
generation of educated graduates emerged. Since there was virtually no industry in 
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Kashmir, large numbers remained unemployed. G. M. Sadiq, the chief minister in his 
meeting with Indira Gandhi in 1968 told in presence of Inder Gujral: “ India spends 
millions on Kashmir but very little in Kashmir. If I were to tell you that the law and order 
situation requires one more division of the army, you would send it, without the blink of 
any eye, but if I ask you to set up two factories, you will tell me twenty reasons why it 
cannot be done and therefore what do our youth do?” Gujral, who subsequently acted as 
convenor for a Committee of Ministers of State to deal with Kashmir, remarked:  
 
But I confess with a great deal of regret and dismay, that our achievements were 
very marginal. We succeeded in setting up two factories, but we were unable to 
make any dent on unemployment. Some progress was made in agriculture, but 
that was not much of an achievement because agriculture and fruits were growing 
in any case. Most of the concessions which were given were utilized by the 
industries more in Jammu area, but hardly anything in Kashmir. The major failure 
is that we should have concentrated more on public sector investment. Apart from 
the merits and demerits, public sector investment encourages the private sector. 
And since in Kashmir disquiet was there all the time, for one reason or the other 








                                                          
24 Ethnonationalism is a function of both permissive and triggering causes emanating from both internal 
and external settings. In this section ethnonationalism stemming from the internal setting will be discussed, 
while ethnonationalism emanating from the external setting will be discussed under the section of “other 
explanation of the uprising”. While ethnonationlism arising out of the internal setting has been viewed as a 
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Many vocabularies have come into force to give it a conceptual twist.25 All shades of 
opinion on the issue are grouped as the primordialists versus instrumentalists (Easman, 
1995; Yinger, 1993). Both versions have their points of strengths and weaknesses. This 
debate is more pronounced in South Asia (especially, in India)—a debate that has been 
dominated by two distinguished British scholars such as Paul R. Brass, and Francis 
Robinson. These two scholars differ in their approach on the issue of ethnicity and 
nationalism in South Asia despite their marked identical perceptions on the topic. From 
the angle of the primordialist, which the leaders of Muslim separatism also shares, 
Hindus and Muslims constituted in pre-modern times distinct civilizations destined to 
develop into separate nations once political mobilization took place. The differences 
between the two cultures were so great that it was not conceivable that assimilation of the 
two could take place and that a single national culture could be created to which both 
would contribute (Brass, 1995: 87-88). Robinson subscribes to this view.  
 
The opposite view is that the culture and religious differences between Hindus and 
Muslims were not so great as to rule out the creation of either a composite national 
culture or at least a secular political union in which those aspects of group culture that 
could not be shared would be relegated to the private sphere (Brass, 1995: 88). Brass 
                                                                                                                                                                             
direct cause, ethnonationalism arising out of the external setting is seen as tangential factor—a factor that is 
explained from the perspective of “diffusion” theory.   
  
25 Definitional problem is there. Primodialism (s), tribalism, regionalism, communalism, parochialism, and 
subnationalism among the more often encountered alternatives. Connor notes that imprecise vocabulary is 
both a symptom of and a contributor to a great deal of the haziness surrounding the study of ethnonalism 




subscribes to this latteral view. From this point of view, Muslim separatism was not pre-
ordained, but resulted from the conscious manipulation of selected symbols of Muslims 
identity by Muslim elite groups in economic and political competition with each other 
and with elite groups among Hindus (Brass, 1995: 88). Brass and Robinson, as hinted 
earlier, despite their agreement, differ in attaching the relative weight to be assigned to 
the pervasiveness of Islamic values, the strength of Muslim religious institutions, and the 
like. Robinson argues, as Brass points out, that the religious difference between Muslims 
and Hindus in the nineteenth century, before social mobilization began, “were 
fundamental” and that some of those differences, such as on idol worship, on 
monotheism and on attitudes toward the cow “created a basic antipathy” between the two 
communities “which helped to set them apart as modern politics and self-governing 
institutions developed in town, district and province” (Brass, 1995: 88). Brass admits that 
Robinson’s arguments were not entirely inconsistent with his own work. Brass holds that 
in his work it was not assumed that the pre-existing cultures or religious practices of 
ethnic groups are infinitely malleable by elites (Brass, 1995: 88-89).  
 
Nation formation, Brass says is “the process by which elites and counter-elites 
within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and 
meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its 
interests, and to compete with other groups” (Quoted in Robinson, 1995: 217).  In 
his book, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Paul Brass has 
explained the phenomenon thus: there was little in the objective difference 
between Hindus and Muslims, and not much more in their revivalist movements 
to make their separation inevitable. What was crucial was the process of  “symbol 
selection”; and the fact that Muslim elites chose divisive rather than composite 
symbols. “Muslim leaders in north India in the late nineteenth century, Brass 
holds, “did not recognize a common destiny with the Hindus, because they saw 
themselves in danger of losing their privileges as a dominant community . . .” So 
they chose to stress on “a special sense of history incompatible with Hindu 
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aspirations and a myth of Muslim decline into backwardness” (Quoted in 
Robinson, 1995: 214).  
 
 
The reassertion of this “Hindu nationalism” has taken a jingoistic form in the early 1980s 
with the rise of the BJP, the religiously extremist party of India. The following discussion 
testifies this. The Hindu nationalist view that India is for Hindus only26 and that could be 
maintained through the application of “Hindutva” (Hinduness)—a condition where the 
slogan: “Hindi! Hindu! Hindustan!, which could be transposed as One language! One 
People! One country!: becomes the objectives of the state as it does not oppose jus soil to 
jus sanguinis. (Assayag, 1998: 27-44; Clifton, 1999: 14-15; Jain, 1994; Pandey, 1993; 
Vidal, 1998: 149-172).27 Kakar, MacGuire and et al, and Nirod C. Chaudhury have have 
portrayed the extremist elements of Hindu nationalism (Kakar, 1998: 558; MacGuire and 
others, 1998: 561; Chaudhury, 1951: 407-408). The problem is an old one. Theh 
following quotation from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will clarify the point:  
 
It is interesting to note that the early waves of nationalism in India in the 19th 
century were religious and Hindu. The Muslims, naturally could take no part in 
this Hindu nationalism. They kept apart. Having kept away from English 
education, the new ideas affected them less and there was far less intellectual 
ferment among them. Many decades after, they began to come out of their shell, 
and then, as with the Hindus, their nationalism began to look back to Islamic 
traditions and cultures and was fearful of losing these because of the Hindu 
majority (Nehru, 1967: 437).28 
                                                          
26 Gandhi has maintained that if Hindus believe that “India should be peopled only by Hindus, they are 
living in dreamland”  ((Gandhi, Hind Swarz, in Parel, 1997: 52).   
27 The classical treatment of racial origins of different nations is given by Romila Thapar, Professor of 
Ancient History (Thapar, 1996).   
28 Gandhi is the first to treat the problem of nationalism in India. Admitting that it is a “serious” problem, 
he takes an assimilationist appraoch to resolve the problem of nationalism as he underscores the need of 
“faculty for assimilation”  and uses the word samas.  “Samas is a grammatical technique of forming a new 
word by intregrating two or more pre-existing words. For example the word mahatma is formed from maha 
and atma. Something of the old identity is retained in the new compound word, but the latter has a new 




What one witnesses today is the old problem in a new form, which has assumed an 
extremely militant form. As various scholars argue that Hinduness has both cultural and 
religious components; and Hindu nationalist views it from both angles (Assayag, 1998: 
27-44; Vershney, 1998: 45; Vidal, 1998: 149-172).29 What is more pertinent is the BJP’s 
political manifesto that bears serious implications for the Muslims living in Kashmir and 
other parts of India. The BJP’s manifesto advocates, among others, (i) the construction of 
a Hindu temple on the side of the demolished Ayodhya mosque; (ii) the adoption of a 
common civil code to supersede all the personal laws of the religious minorities; (iii) the 
termination of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir; (iv) the liquidation of the 
National Minorities Commissions. They all are anathema to the Muslims of India in 
general and the Kashmiri Muslims in particular as they are a minority in India when 
compared to the total Hindu population of India. Such a philosophy carries the germs of 
splitting India on Hindu-Muslim ethno-religious lines. Vershney thoughtfully offers a 
capsule summary of the very fluid ethnic configuration in India: “The only cleavage that 
has the potential to rip India apart is the divide between Hindus and Muslims” (Vershney, 
1998: 44).30  
                                                                                                                                                                             
means that though the nation is formed out of distinct ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, the new 
identity that emerges has an identity of its own. India in this sense is a nation. Gandhi is a cultural 
assimilationist in that all Indians, while retaining their sub-national identities, are supposed to share 
cenrtain common values and symbols” (Parel, 1997 footnote 85: 52).  
29 BJP’s ideology has serious implications for the future of Indian democracy. It has been asserted that if 
the BJP becomes successful to implement its ideology, India would leave the democracy friendly realm of 
what Dhal called “subcultural pluralism” and enter the more dangerous one of “cultural dualism” –a 
situation where Hindu majority will dominate the non-Hindu minority (Referred to in Vershney, 1998: 45).    
30 Scholars studying ethnic conflict have offered avaluable distinction. They are: dispersed and centrally 
focused ethnic configuration (Horwitz, 1985). In a dispersed configuration, there is a host of locally or 
regionally specific identities. By contrast, the centrally focused configuration involves a small number of 
identities that cut across the entire country. Under the dispersed type, ethnic conflicts remain localized; here 
the center can often maneuver between the fighting groups while seeming to stand outside the conflict. 
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Such developments and the recent rise of Hindu fundamentalist nationalism under the 
BJP have once again put the perimodialist versus instrumentalist debate on the front 
burner. The debate has become all the more pertinent in the context of the current 
uprising in Kashmir. It is so because the very “composite national culture”, or a “secular 
political union”, which were the characteristics features of Kashmir that distinguished it 
from other parts of India, has been replaced by divisive rather than composite symbols. 
Consequently, instead of “secular political union” communal political union has become 
the order of the day. This, in turn, has contributed to the breakdown of the composite 
Kashmiri national identity, called Kashmiriyat.     
 
Although the importance of any identity varies with each encounter, one or two identities 
usually take precedence. David Miller has put it tersely:  
 
One person may think of herself as above all a woman, another as a bird-watcher, 
a third as a Muslim. In plural societies most are likely to have composite identities 
in which different affiliations come to the fore on different occasions. Some of 
these identities are chosen, some unchosen, but it will be to a considerable degree 
a matter of choice which aspects any particular person makes central to their 
conception of themselves. . . . Ethnicity is a pervasive phenomenon, in the sense 
that it is something that a person carries with her wherever she goes: you may be a 
fanatical bird-watcher at weekends, but this has no particular implications for the 
way in which you are treated in the weekday world, whereas if you are ethnically 
black in a white-dominated society, or ethnically Tamil in a society dominated by 
Sinhalese, this is likely to condition your experience in all spheres of life: in work, 
in leisure, in politics, and so forth. As a result, ethnic identities very often give rise 
to demands for political recognition. Unless the group you belong to has its 
identity confirmed in symbolic and other ways by the relevant state, you are likely 
to feel vulnerable and demeaned (emphasis added Miller, 1995: 120-122)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Under the latter type, the ubiquity of the clevages tend to foster heightened conflict throughout the system, 
threatening the integrity of the center. Ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, 
and ethnic conflict between the Chinese and the Malays in Malaysia represent the examples of the latter 
type, while uprising in Kashmir represents the former type in that the uprising in Kashmir has never spilled 
to over to include all Indian Muslim (Vershney, 1998: 43)..         
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In a similar fashion, A. D. Smith has asserted: 
 
 
Other nations where a nation-to-be could boast no ethnic antecedents of 
importance and where any ethnic ties were shadowy or fabricated, the need to 
forge out of whatever cultural components where available a coherent mythology 
and symbolism of a community of history and culture became everywhere 
paramount as a condition of national survival and unity. Without some ethnic 
lineage the nation-to-be could fall apart (Smith, 1991: 42)  
 
  
Bell-Fialkoff notes that in much of Eastern Europe, however, profession, as a status 
marker, is less important than ethnic affiliation. A West European (and even more so an 
American), to the question “Who are you?” will probably say that: “I am an engineer” or 
whatever. An Eastern European will most likely answer this question with “I am Polish” 
or “Ukrainian”. This shows that the stress on specific components in the total complex of 
collective identities has a spatial dimension (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996: 71). Andrew Bell-
Fiakoff further argues that there is another feature of collective identity we may want to 
cover, its rigidity. In Europe, especially in ethnically mixed areas of Eastern and Central 
Europe, ethnicity is quite rigid: if one was born of German parents one is always a 
German, even if one does not speak a word of German (only intermarriage can change 
the children’s affiliation). In other parts of the world, affiliation is much more fluid, and 
people of mixed origin who feel equally at ease within two or more ethnic groups often 
choose their public personal depending on the situation. This gives rise to the situational 
or optional ethnicity that is quite baffling to Westerners (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996: 71). 
Interrelationships of various collectivities can be vertical or lateral (horizontal). Groups 
of the same order, such as tribes, may coexist side by side on terms of equality 
(“vertically). Others may form complex stratified systems, like castes in India or classes 
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elsewhere (in horizontal layers, or “laterally”). Both types of group order, vertical and 
lateral, may coexist within the same society: several castes may have similar status while 
several other castes are above and below them (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996: 71).  
 
Some scholar such as Varshney, who teaches at Columbia University, New York, has 
traced, as hinted earlier, the origins of the Kashmiri uprising to the clash of three 
competing visions of nationalism: Kashmiri, secular, and Islamic (Vershney, 1992: 220). 
He argued that during the first two decades of independence, Hindu-Muslim conflict was 
dormant because migrations to Pakistan left the Muslim community of India leaderless 
and because Congress under Nehru’s secular leadership maintained a multi-religious 
character (Vershney, 1998: 44). But since the mid-1970s, however, Muslim middle class 
has emerged, while the Congress Party, mindful of its waning of its preeminence, “has 
compromised its once-firm secularism for the sake of electoral calculations” (Vershney, 
1998: 44). According to the Hindu-nationalist ideology, India’s secularism has 
degenerated into ethnic and religious pandering, with the state held hostage by assertive 
minorities (Vershney, 1998: 45).  Vershney line of arguments becomes creditable with 
the findings of Lijphart. Lijphart, who makes a case of consociationalism in favor of 
India, observes that a “weakening of power-sharing in India after the late 1960” as a 
result of Muslim-Hindu clashes resulting from the surging demands of lower-cast groups, 
linguistic and regional groups and the powerful mobilization of Hindutva and Muslim 
sentiments (Lustic, 1997: 117, for details, 88-117). 
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In light of the preceding discussion, especially, taking the cue from Bell-Fialkoff, one 
may argue that Kashmir represents both types of group orders involving vertical and 
lateral identities. Both these types coexisted in harmony in Kashmir in the past. Also, the 
very rigidity aspect of the identity was prevalent in Kashmir as the Kashmiris retained a 
composite identity, called Kashmiriyat. This rigidity component cannot always be 
maintained in countries where the nation-building process is an unfinished task. India, 
which is a fascinating laboratory of nation building, neatly fits in this scenario. It is 
argued that nation exists in the mind of the people and that the nation-states are 
“imagined political communities” has been interminably repeated since Benedict 
Anderson’s work: Imagined Communities was published in 1991 (Anderson, 1991: 6). As 
B. C. Smith rightly points out that a subjective belief that people constitute a nation is 
more important than objective definitions of historians and social scientists (Smith, 1996: 
274).  
 
Kashmir, which is another fascinating laboratory of nation building, and which retained a 
kind of secular identity, was subjected to assert its religious-based identity when its 
ethnic-based identity took a communal color on the eve of the 1989 uprising, thereby 
dividing the nation on lateral-based identity. In that process ethnicity became religionized. 
In India, and for that matter in South Asia, Islam provides the organic link between 
religion and ethnicity. This organic link is inseparable. For example, Muslims, from any 
part of the world, can have twin-identity at a time: one is based on their religion, and the 
other on their ethnicity (Ahmed, 1994b: 67-88). A Kashmiri Muslim has twin identities: 
Muslimness and Kashmiriness: the former is religion-based identity (horizontal 
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component), and the latter is ethnicity-based identity (vertical component). Both are 
organically linked to each other, and hence they are inseparable. When the horizontal 
component, that is, Muslimness is emphasized, the vertical component, that is, 
Kashmiriyat gets threatened and weakened giving rise to communalism a condition 
where ethnicity began to be religionized, splitting the vertical collective identity of the 
nation, here: the Kashmiriyat.  It is a common practice in India to play off the “communal 
card” against each competing nation to realize the political goals of the Indian ruling elite. 
Although Kashmir has an impressive record of secular politics, this record was spotted 
with communal politics as was evident from the preceding analysis (see, especially, Puri, 
1962). Bell-Fialkoff contends that:         
 
“As long as religion provides the basis for collective identity and retains 
its strength, coexistence with other religious groups is not to be expected. 
It is feasible only when one religious group subordinates all others, as did 
Islam in India and the Balkans, in hierarchy of religions. In Germany of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where a clear predominance could 
not be established, separation was regious eius religio”(emphasis added 
Bell-Fialkoff, 1996: 60).  
 
In India the Hindu nationalists’ key concern centers round what they call Muslim 
disloyalty to India (Vershney, 1998: 45). Hence subnationalism continued to dominate 
the Indian polity, and scholars began interpreting the Kashmir conflict from the 
perspective of subnationalism (Chadda, 1997; Mehta, 1998; Mitra and Lewis, 1996). As 
Sagarika Dutta puts: “The rise of the BJP in India emphasises the importance of religious 
and cultural identities but still does not prove that India is a nation. There has always 
been a tension between national and subnational identities in India. Not everyone who 
lives within the territorial borders of India considers him/herself to be an Indian 
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nationalists—for example Kashmiris seeking independence” (emphasis added Dutta, 
1998: 411). The Kashmiri politics that was discussed in three distinct periods shows how 
Sheikh Abdullah had to oscillate between two poles: loyalty versus disloyalty. As 
disloyalty prevailed over loyalty in his dealings with the Center (New Delhi), loyalty 
disappeared in the sense of Conner and ethnonationalism became the competing deciding 
force.    
 
B. Triggering causes: emanating from the internal setting 
  
i. Ethnic/political mobilization  
  
Many believe that economic development and modernization as “taproots” of instability 
and internal conflicts. Better education, higher literacy rates, and improved access to 
growing mass media raise awareness of where different people stand in society. It also 
raises economic and political expectations, and can lead to mounting frustration when 
these expectations are not met (Brown, 1996: 21; 1996-19). Olzak and Tsutsu study 
extends arguments from existing theories to consider an explanation of ethnic 
mobilization at the world system level. The analysis uses structural equation models to 
compare data on ethnic mobilization in 130 countries (including India and Pakistan) from 
1965 to 1990 (Olzak and Tsutsui, 1998: 691-720). Samuel P. Huntington, in his book, 
Political Order in Changing Societies, has pointed out that the combination of 
institutional decay and political mobilization could lead to political instability. 
Huntington asserts the process of economic modernization can contribute to increasing 
demands for political participation by opening up new opportunities for physical, social 
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and economic mobility (Huntington, 1968). India’s political evolution matches 
Huntington’s arguments. To Huntington, political mobilization is a function of increased 
literacy, media exposure, and economic development.Two more important works that 
analyze the impact of modernization and are relevant to the current thesis are Saul 
Newman’s “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?” (Newman, 1991: 451-
478) and Charles Tilly’s “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” (Tilly, 1973: 425-
447). They do identify the pitfalls of modernization and argue that modernization opens 
up avenues of political consciousness among ethnic groups leading them to assert their 
voices for more rights and privileges that are often in conflict with the states’ interests. 
Myron Weiner has argued, accelerating mobility in the context of scarce resources in a 
multiethnic society can lead to political mobilization along ethnic lines and can result in 
interethnic tensions (Weiner, 1978). 
  
The good level of education and the media access that primarily contribute to ethnic 
mobilization could be argued were prevalent in case of Kashmir. It ought to be noted here 
that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was perhaps the first in the country to introduce 
modern education. A mission school, the first to introduce a university syllabus, came up 
way back in 1881. English began to replace Persian and Urdu. In 1886, a state school 
followed the course set by the mission school and turned out a large number of 
matriculates. It was Dr A Mitra who raised the status of the state school, introducing 
English curriculum.  In 1905, a college was opened in Srinagar with the help of Annie 
Besant, and another in Jammu in 1908.31  
                                                          
31 The Pandits took advantage of these institutions, while the Muslims kept away from them. However, 
when the Muslims realized their backwardness and were eager to take advantage of English education, the 
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A closer examination will show that the dramatic growth in literacy rates during the 
1960s and 1970s was possible owing to the growth of educational institutions in Kashmir.  
In the ten years from 1971 to 1981, the overall literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir grew 
by 43.54 percent, the third-fastest growth rate in the nation (Table 4.1). The dramatic 
increase in enrollments in educational institutions was noticeable during the period 
(Tables 4.2 and 4.3).   
 
Table 4.1 Literacy Rates in Jammu and Kashmir, 1961-81  
Year Male Female Total Population Ten-year % increase 
1961 16.97 4.26 11.03  
1971 26.75 9.28 18.58 68.45 
1981 36.29 15.88 26.67 43.54 
 
Source: Government of India, 1981: Handbook of Populations Statistics  







Table 4.2 Educational Enrollments in Jammu and Kashmir, 1950-93 
Year Primary Middle Secondary General 
colleges






                                                                                                                                                                             




1950-1 78,000 20,.000 5,600 2,779 __ __ __ __ 
1960-1 216,000 60, 000 22,000 8,005 174 171 182 __ 
1968-9 362,000 105,000 51,000 16,718 1,285 1,280 848 80 
1980-1 537,800 167,200 83,600 15,828 3,351 1,286 1,072 294 
1985-6 663,700 232,700 132,800 20,089 4,139 2,784 1,110 312 
1992-3 940,000 370,000 262,000 34,000 NA NA NA NA 
 
 Sources: Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Planning and Development, Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, Digest of Statistics, 1985-86 (Srinar: Government Press, 1968); Jammu and 
Kashmir: An Economic Profile (New Delhi: Government of India, 1995), p. 18  
 
 
Table 4.2 shows that enrollments in primary, middle, secondary, general colleges, and 
universities were 216,000, 60,000, 22,000, 8,005, and 174, respectively in 1960-61. The 
corresponding figures jumped to 940, 000, 370,000, 262,00, 34,00, and 4,139 (1985-6), 









Table 4.3 University enrollment levels in Jammu and Kashmir, 1950-1 and 1976-7 








% of (1981) 
populationa  
General Male 2,417  13,726  
Female    252    7,102  
Professional Male      50    2,986  
Female      10       545  
Special Male    109       370  
Female        5         80  
Total  2,843 .087% 24,809 .414% 
a. Population of Jammu and Kashmir in 1951 = 3,253,852; in 1981= 5,987,389. 
Sources: Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Planning and Development, Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, Digest of Statestics, 1977-78, vol. 2 (Srinagar: Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir, 1978), p. 271;  Directorate of Census Operations, Jammu and Kashmir, Census of India, 1981: A 




Table 4.3 demonstrates that the university enrollment jumped to .414 percent in 1976-77 
from its corresponding figures of .087 percent in 1950-51. It can be deduced from this 
tremendous growth in educational facilities that they lend a strong credence to the 
Kashmiris to get conscious about their rights and privileges in the society making them 
aware of politics at local, national and international level.  
 
The outcome of the expanded education became all the more fruitful and rewarding for 
the Kashmiris in their efforts to assert their rights and privileges because of the 
simultaneous expansion of mass media. This gave them added fillip to mobilize them 
politically at a faster rate. During the period of 1965 to 1984, India in general and 
Kashmir in particular registered an unprecedented growth of print industry (Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4 Number of newspapers published in Jammu and Kashmir and in India as 
a whole, 1965-84 
 1965 1970 1975 1984 
Jammu and Kashmir      46     102     135      203 
All India 7,906 11,306 12,423 21,784 
 
Sources: Mass Media in India, 1978 (New Delhi Publications Divisions Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of India, 1978); Mass media in India, 1986 (New Delhi: Publications Divisions, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1987).  
 
 
Table 4.4 shows that in 1965, only 46 newspapers were published in Kashmir. Ten years 
later, 135 papers were being published. By 1991, the number had grown to 254. Thus, 
within twenty-five years, the number of newspapers published grew by some 450 percent. 
In addition to the dramatic increase in the actual numbers of newspapers published, 
Kashmir saw significant increases in newspaper circulation. For example, in 1982, total 
newspaper circulation in Kashmir was estimated to be around 119,000. Two years later, 
the circulation had risen to 192,000. In another five years, the figure was 369,000. By 
1990, newspaper circulation was down sharply to only 280,000. In 1992 it stood at 
297,000. 
 
In addition, Kashmir, along with other parts of India, has seen a significant growth in the 
electronic media, especially television and video and audio tape recorders. Owing to its 
location, Kashmir was one of the earliest states in India to have access to television. (The 
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Indian government wanted to ensure that the Kashmiris were not exposed only to 
Pakistani broadcasts). 
 
Table 4.5 reveals that in 1950-51 only 12 villages of Kashmir was electrified. By 1976-77, 
the corresponding figure stood at 2,047. The ability of even rural Kashmiris to receive 
television and radio broadcasts was facilitated by the tremendous state-driven process of 
rural electrification. With the blessings of rural electrification the level of conscious 
swept the mass level. This is something that is unseen in other villages of Jammu and 
Ladakh. 
 
Table 4.5 Extent of rural electrification in Jammu and Kashmir, 1950-1 and 1976-7 
 Number of villages with a source of electrical power 
Jammu Kashmir Ladakh 
1950-1       3      12  0 
1976-7 1,293 2,047 18 
 
Sources: Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Planning and Development, Directorate of 
Evaluation and Statistics, Digest of Statistics, 1977-78, vol. 2 (Srinagar: Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir, 1978), p. 150. 
 
The Kashmiris made a good use of these modern facilities by proving them politically 
more conscious. In 1972 Srinagar was the third “television center” to be commissioned in 
India, after Delhi and Bombay. Access to television broadcasts depends on the 
availability of television sets. The most recent estimate, made in 1992, suggests that 
Kashmir had 118,000 television sets, or 1 per 65 residents (Ganguly, 1997: 36). 
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The same holds true about the proliferation of videocassette recorder (VCRs) and 
videotapes. According to the statistical figure of 1982, India had 180,000 VCRs, which 
accounted for 11.6 percent of those homes that had television sets. A year later, the 
corresponding figure rose to 530,000 pushing the percentage from 11.6 percent to 34.2 
percent (Ganguly 1997: 36), meaning almost threefold increase. Although same data on 
Kashmir are extremely difficult to obtain, it is assumed from the increasing popularity of 
video parlors in Kashmir that there will be no big difference about the relative data 
picture between Kashmir and other parts of India. All these spectacular growth of data 
emphatically hint that the current generation of Kashmirs were exposed to more 
information making them conscious of their rights and privileges. 
 
ii. The political /institutional decay 
 
India, which is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual state, had started-off with a 
federal and multiparty system of government. Although it is the largest democracy in the 
world in terms of population, there were flagrant violations of some fundamental 
principles of democracy despite its good record of maintaining its policy of secularism. 
The origins of the institutional decay in India could be traced in Indira Gandhi’s rule. By 
contrast, the process of institutional decay in Kashimir dates back during India’s first 
Premier, Nehru, when he undertook the policy of integrating Kashmir into India’s fold—
a point that has been highlighted in the preceding discussion. This job was done 
vigorously and in a more anti-democratic way by his successor governments, thereby 
sowing the seeds of grievances and alienation among the Kashmiris. One of the key 
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principles of democracy: the right to fair and free elections was consistently denied and 
ignored to the Kashmiri people by the Center resulting in a steady and gradual 
institutional decay—a process that threw India in a state of sever crisis of governability.  
Here particular importance will be given in the consistent electoral fraud and wrongdoing 
in Kashmir by the Center.  
 
After the death of Nehru, her daughter Indira Gandhi, who became the Prime Minister of 
India, instituted a dynastic rule in India making Indian democracy a mockery. To effect 
Gandhi’s personalized rule she had to resort to coercion (Mathur, 1992) and it became the 
order of the day for her to perpetuate her rule in India. In essence, Indira Gandhi and her 
successors made a U-turn from Nehru’s efforts of institutionalizing democracy in India 
(Brass, 1994; Kholi, 1992;).32 Following the death of Sheikh Abdullah in September 
1982, his son Farooq Abdullah succeeded him. Indira Gandhi went one step further in the 
process of institutional decay in Kashmir when in the 1983 state assembly elections 
Indira Gandhi pressurized Farooq Abdullah to forge an electoral alliance between Indira 
Gandhi’s the Congress Party (I) and the National Conference. Farooq Abdullah turned 
Indira’s proposal down, which generated tension between the Center and the State. 
Farooq Abdullah, much against the pleasure of Indira, contested the elections alone. The 
National Conference got victorious (Table 4.6). But resolute to install a Congress 
government in Kashmir, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dismissed Farooq Abdullah in 
July 1984 on insubstantial grounds replacing him with his rival G.M.Shah who defected 
                                                          
32 In South Asia problems of governance is severe. On the political front one may witness a kind of 
criminalization process pervades the South Asian polity that corrupts the key machinery of the governmets 
causing political and institutonal decay.     
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from the National Conference and formed a new party under the name of the Awami 
National Conference (Khaleda).  
 
C.  Most-immediate catalytic triggering factors: emanating from the internal setting 
 
i. Rajiv-Farooq electoral alliance in 1985  
 
What Indira Gandhi could not achieve, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, who became the Indian 
Premier following her tragic assassination by her Sheikh body guards, could do so by 
forming an electoral alliance in November 1985 between his Congress Party and the 
National Conference of Abdullah. The move, which proved to be a tremendous 
psychological shock to the Kashmiris, met with their utter disapproval. They took serious 
exception to this arrangement, and felt betrayal by Farooq whom they hailed as their 
national hero when back in 1984 he rebuffed such a proposal by Indira Gandhi. To the 
Kashmiris he became more popular following his unjust and unfair dismissal in July 1984 
by the dictates of Indira Gandhi who punished Farooq for his obduracy and disloyalty to 
her. It was beyond the wildest ken of the Kashmiris that the same Farooq, who did not 
compromise with Indira, would play a different poker game by playing foul at the cost of 
the Kashmiri interest. Farooq had to pay heavy price for his betrayal, for it tarnished his 
image, and in the image-perception of the Kashmiris, he became a traitor. As Tavleen 
Singh reports: “Overnight, Farooq was transformed from hero to traitor in the Kashmiri 
mind. People could not understand how a man who had been treated the way he had by 
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Delhi, and especially by the Gandhi family, could now be crawling to them for accords 
and alliances” (Singh, 1995: 98).  
 
True, as a leader, he was not as charismatic as his father was. But he pledged at the time 
of becoming the head of the National Conference that he would never betray the cause of 
the Kashmiris. The Rajiv-Farooq 1986 accord was not only the break of his promise but 
was also a sell out of the Kashmiris interest and the crushing of the cult of pride that his 
father, Sheikh Abdullah, left to the Kashmiris. As the noted Indian Muslim journalist, M. 
J. Akbar, in his book, recalls:  
 
[Farooq] was charged with betraying his father’s fifty-year legacy of pride. It 
created a vacuum where the National Conference had existed, and extremists 
stepped into that vacuum. Kashmiriyat had become vulnerable to the votaries of 
violence and Muslim hegemony, both injuring Kashmir and perverting 
Kashmiriyat (Akbar, 1991: 213).      
 
 
Significantly, neither the Center nor the State could fathom that the accord would have 
serious ramification leading to the rise of the fundamentalist forces in Kashmir—the 
forces that both the Center and the State tried to uproot. The religiously oriented and 
fundamentalist political parties numbering at least ten joined the Muslim United Front 
(MUF) under the leadership of Maulvi Abbas Ansari to contest the 1987 elections. 
Furthermore, Abdul Gani Lone’s People’s Conference and G. M. Shaha’s Awami 
National Conference held discussions with MUF. Such a coalition-like development was 
perceived as a threat to the National Conference of Farooq Abdullah. Farooq, who 
became fearful of such a challenging sign that never surfaced in the politics of Kashmir, 
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felt constraint to arrest several MUF leaders and a number of election agents before the 
1987 elections hinting his unfair dealing with the oppositions right from the beginning.  
 
ii.  Electoral wrongdoing in the 1987 elections 
 
 The 1987 elections (Table 3.6 shows the election results by party-wise) are considered to 
be the most unfair and rigged in Kashmir’s recent history (Ganguly, 1997; Hewitt, 1995; 
Kamal, 1995; Lamb, 1995; Newberg, 1995; Rahman, 1996; Scofield, 1996; Treambaly, 
1995). 
 
 Table: 4. 6 State Assembly Elections, 1951-1987 
Party 1951 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1983 1987 
National Conference 75 68 69 8 a 47 47 38 
Congress - - - 61 57 11 26 28 
Jan Singh -   - - 4 3   -   - - 
Praja Prashad - 5 3 - - - - - 
Janata Party - - - - - 13 - - 
Bharitya Janata Party - - - - - - - 2 
Muslim United Front - - - - - - - 4 
Peoples Conference - - - - - - 1 - 
Jamat-i-Islami - - - - 5 1 - - 
Harijan Mandal - 1 - - - - - - 
Panthers Party - - - - - - 1 - 
Independents - 1 2 2 9 4 1 4 
 
Source: Shaheen Akhtar, Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu and Kashmir. Islamabad Institute of Regional 
Studies, 1991. 
Note: a National Conference was merged in the Congress. 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows that National Conference-Congress alliance secured the maximum seats, 
while the MUF begged 4, with the Jamat-i-Islami finishing with zero. Lamb asserts: “The 
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1987 elections were as unfree and unfair as any other held in the history of the State, with 
the arguable exception of those of 1977” (Lamb, 1994: 260). The farcical nature of 
elections held by the Indian Government in Kashmir has been exposed by Tavleen Singh: 
“Elections were held regularly but everyone knew that the process was not so much one 
of election as selection. Only those candidates who had the blessings of Delhi ever won. 
Everyone had learned to accept this in a sullen sort of way . . .” (Singh: 1995: 120 quoted 
in Kamal, 1997: 1).     
 
Strangely enough, the Indian media was not very forthcoming in criticizing the Center-
State-engineered fraud in the 1987 elections despite a few exceptions. One exception was 
the influential English weekly, India Today. It was the only leading national magazine at 
the time to admit that the 1987 elections had been rigged. A popular contemporary Indian 
journalist, Tavleen Singh, who highlighted this point, reported:  
 
Most other newspapers, and in particular those who had been vociferous about the 
rigging charges they made in 1983, remained strangely silent this time, pretending 
that the election had been won fair and square. The same Farooq Abdullah who 
had been vilified in 1983 as a traitor and secessionist and pro-Pakistan was 
suddenly a national hero. There was only one reason for this remarkable change 
of attitude. It was Farooq Abdullah’s decision to be friends with the Congress 
Party (emphasis added Singh, 1995: 110)  
 
 
The fact that the 1987 elections were really rigged and fraud was documented by Indian 
press media later, say, in 1990. The leading daily of India, the Times of India commented: 
“There was a consensus in the administration and the intelligence agencies that the 
Congress-National Conference alliance had resorted to large scale rigging” (Times of 
India, 1990: 6 quoted in Kamal, 1997: 10). The English weekly, Sunday, reported:  
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In anger, the election agent of Syed Salahuddin, the chief of the Hizbul 
Mujahideen now, tried to storm his house carrying Kalashnikov and was gunned 
down. Kashmiris consider him their first martyr (in the on-going freedom 
struggle). Salahuddin had the unparalleled experience of being declared elected 
by the returning officer, being given the certificate too, and then hearing on TV 
that he had lost massively (Sunday, 1995: 30).   
      
 
As acknowledged later by A. G. Noorani, and by many Indian analysts:  
 
The rigging of the 1987 poll proved disastrous for India because this time 
electoral fraud was coupled with the use of force. Protests were sought to be 
silenced by arrests and beatings. Many of the leaders of the armed militants were 
participants in that fateful poll, and they became utterly disillusioned with Indian 
democracy” (Noorani, 1995: 11).  
  
 
 Reflecting back on that period, Tavleen Singh writes:  
 
The rigged election was the beginning of the end. When I next went to Kashmir 
some months afterwards nearly everyone I met said that most of the youths who 
had acted as election agents and workers for the MUF candidates were now 
determined to fight for their rights differently. They had no choice but to pick up 
the gun, was the message I was given. Farooq Abdullah did what Congress chief 
ministers had done before him. “He tried to buy Kashmir. Not since 1953 (when 
Sheikh Abdullah was imprisoned) had there been a properly elected, popular chief 
minister, so the only way for them to survive was to pour money into the Valley, 
to subsidize rice and do a variety of things of this kind which failed to impress the 
Kashmiris but served definitely to widen the chasm between them and the rest of 







   
The Report of the Women’s Initiative had this to say:  
 
 
The 1987 elections were the last hope of the Kashmiris to have a democratic 
Government chosen by the people within the framework of the Constitution of 
India. The United Muslim Front—the origin of today’s militant groups—was 
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ousted even though it had already been announced on All-India Radio that it had 
polled the majority of votes. The rigging was led by Farooq Abdullah, 
representing the National Conference-Congress combine. The then Governor, 
Jagmohan, in his report to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, stated sarcastically: 
“You have won the election, but lost Kashmir” (Quoted in Kamal, 1997: 11)      
 
Significantly, the several key insurgents leaders, Shabir Shah, Yasin Malik, and Javed 
Mir, who were the polling agents for the MUF in the 1987 elections, were the direct 
witnesses of the mass rigging of the 1987 elections. The extensive electoral wrongdoing 
that they witnessed in the 1987 elections was enough of a hint for this young generation 
of Kashmiris that the Center does not at all care to give a damn to their political rights. 
The electoral wrongdoing that has been consistently practiced by the New Delhi 
government has earned an ire and disrespect for the Center. The Center played its final 
stroke of electoral fraud at the cost of splitting the collective identity of the Kashmiris. 
Gripped by utter disillusionment and frustration, they began drifting in the vortex of 
violence and conflict with the Center, thereby bringing about a change in the entire 
matrix of communal harmony that preserved the societal fabrics of the Kashmiri society 
for centuries. The British scholar, Hewitt, rightly portrays the very multifaceted 
ramifications of the developments in the following manner:  
 
 Coming out of a period of intra-National Conference rivalries, the so-called 
Farooq-Gandhi pact was followed by what is commonly believed to be the most 
rigged election in the history of Indian politics. The year 1987 is, in retrospect, an 
important turning point The Muslim United Front (MUF), which stood against the 
National Conference-Congress-I combine, was denied victory in several 
Assembly constituencies against all popular expectations, to the obvious 
bewilderment of some returning officers. . . . There is one rather staggering fact 
that casts a great deal of light upon the nature of the current Kashmir crisis. Many 
of the militants that we spoke to in 1994 had been involved with the MUF 
coalition and had enthusiastically campaigned in the 1987 election. Their shock 
over the result – and their experience of victimisation afterwards – was for many 
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the final straw. Some moved quickly to terrorism and acts of violence, others 
removed themselves from politics altogether. The cultural matrix of Jammu and 
Kashmir society quickly began to transform and to polarise, with the Hindus 
leaving, supporting extremist national parties (such as the BJP) instead of the 
Congress-I or demanding a separate political solution within their own state. The 
centre, preoccupied with a change to India’s second non-Congress government, 
was slow to respond to the changing political situation, which involved the 
kidnapping of the Home Minister’s daughter in 1989 by the JKLF. By mid-1989, 
New Delhi was moving troops in to deal with the militants (Hewitt, 1995: 9-10). 
             
 
iii. The farcical 1989 Lok Sobha (Lower Assembly) elections 
 
 In the 1989 Lok Sobha elections (Table 4.7 shows the elections results by party-wise) the 
opposition did not participate. Yet the elections were held amid total boycott by the key 
oppositions. The Independents contested the elections. By any standard, the 1989 Lok 
Sobha elections witnessed the lowest voters’ turnouts.  
 
Table 4.7 Lok Sobha Elections in Jammu and Kashmir, 1967-1989 
Party 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 
National Congress 1 - 2 3 3 3 
Congress(I) 5 5 3 1 3 2 
Congress(U) - - - 1 - - 
Janata Party - - - 1 - - 
Independents - 1 1 - - 1 
 
Source: Shaheen Akhtar, Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu and Kashmir. Islamabad Institute of Regional 
Studies, 1991. 
Note: Lok Sobha, meaning Lower Assembly. 
Although the massive rigging and fraud in the 1987 elections had already set the 
Kashmiris towards the path of the uprising, the 1989 Lok Sobha elections only confirmed 
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once again that the New Delhi government does not care about the opposition 
participation in the elections. This angered the Kashmiris.  
 
The situation that was prevalent in Kashmir on the eve of 1989 was well portrayed by the 
India Today as it reflected throughout Kashmir in 1989 there were: 
 
No poster, no party banners or flags, no speeches or election meetings. So 
successful had the militants’ call to boycott the polls been that the campaign in the 
Kashmir Valley was distinguished by its complete absence. The National 
Conference under Farooq Abdullah was the only party to put up candidates for the 
three Lok Sobha seats in Srinagar, Anantnag, and Baramula. . . . They will be 
elected unopposed without a single poll rally . . . in a mockery of the electoral 
process (India Today, 1989: 14). 
 
According to one observer, the Lok Sobha elections in 1989 witnessed less than 5 percent 
vote turnout in the Valley despite the NC-Congress coalition being in power with Delhi’s 
powerful backing (Malik, 1995: 20). But most observers reported a lower voter turnout, 
ranging from 3 percent to 2 percent of 2.2 million electorates in the Valley. For example, 
Harinader Baweja believes that a mere 2 percent of the people cast vote (Baweja, in 
Kamal, 1995: 20). Governor Jagmohan himself admitted that “hardly three percent of the 
people came out and voted in the Valley” (Zaaher, 1995 quoted in Kamal, 1997: 13). 
International Commission of Jurists had recorded even a lower figure of just one 
percentage of voters’ turnout. (Report of a Mission, 1995 referred to in Kamal, 1997: 13).  
 
D.  Triggering causes: emanating from the external setting: international 
demonstration effect approach 
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i. The 1979 Iranian Revolution (cultural/religious factor)       
 
The theoretical linkage between religion and international politcs is based on the 
assumption that religion plays a critical role in shaping both the normative orientations of 
individuals and their understanding of the surrounding world through ethcial or moral 
prescriptions (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 16 in Tessler and Nachtwey, 1998: 620). 
This is more pertinent to the adherens, as Leege observes, religion “characterizes its 
answers as sacred, eternal, [and] implicated with the ultimate maining of life,” (Leege 
1993: 10 quoted in Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999: 620). The successful revolution 
exclusively based on religion that the world has ever witnessed has left its rippling effect 
on the Muslim world implicating them with the true meaning of Islamic life. The 
Kashmiris have drawn their spiritual zeal and moral enthusiasm from such a successful 
religious revolution, which made them further conscious of their right for self-
determination on the basis of their religious identity. The new generation of Kashmiris 
had the access to information. It made them politically conscious; they could muster 
political mobilization due to media exposure. The “Iranian connection” vis-à-vis the 
Kashmiri uprising has been recognized by many (Ganguly, 1992; Khan, 1990:87-104; 
Rahman, 1996; Schofied, 1996: 220). Khan (1990: 87-104) has given more stressed on it. 
As Khan points out that an indication of the Iranian connection is the Indian reaction to 
what New Delhi called “anti-India” propaganda of the Tehran Radio. An Iranian 
diplomat, Director of Iranian Cultural Center in New Delhi, was denied entry into Jammu 
and Kashmir in early 1988. Apart from Radio Tehran’s alleged hostile attitude, it was 
believed in official circles in Srinagar that the presence of the Iranian diplomat at the 
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foundation-stone laying ceremony of a college to which he was invited would have been 
exploited by “anti-national elements of Kashmir (Nation, 1988 in Khan, 1990: 89).  As 
Khan argues that “the ideological link of the Kashmir freedom fighters with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is natural. The popular uprising in Iran, which overthrew the Shah 
government, had exposed the vulnerability of oppressed regimes. After the success of the 
Islamic revolution the new leaders of Iran encouraged the oppressed of the world, 
particularly the Muslims, to throw away the yoke of bondage and become masters of their 
own destiny. ” (Khan, 1999: 95). The Imam in his final discourse said: 
 
You oppressed masses of the world. You Muslim countries and you Muslims! 
Rise to your feet and get your dues with your teeth and claws, defying the noisy 
propaganda of the super powers, and expel the criminal men at the helm who give 
out the fruits of your toil to your enemies and the enemies of Islam, and let the 
self-committed and serving sectors of the society take the helm of your country, 
all joining together under the dignifying banner of Islam and rising against the 
enemies of Islam, marching towards an independent and free Islamic Republic 
and resting assured that the realization of the proposition would mean the 
subjugation of all oppressors of the world, and helping the oppressed masses to 
become leaders and inheritors of your lands. Let us hope for the advent of that day 
which the Supreme Lord has promised us (al-Khomeini, 1989: 357 quoted in 
Khan, 1999: 95).   
 
Then, there was the Iranian support to the Afghan Mujahideen that continued throughout 
the Afghan resistance movement. In his message to “The Second Seminar on 
Afghanistan” held in Tehran, 2 October 1989, President of Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
alluding to the greatest commonalties that “the Iranian Muslim people” had with the 
Afghan people (Rafsanzani, 1989/90: 523-524 a in Khan, 1999: 96).   
 
“Some physical distance notwithstanding”, the people of Kashmir enjoyed similar 
commonalties with the Iranian Muslim peoples as did the Afghans (Khan, 1999: 96). 
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They could therefore hope for a positive response from Iran, given its Islamic 
commitment. That commitment was reinforced by Iranian statements for support of the 
oppressed in their struggle for freedom. Mr Mahmod Mousavi, Ambassador of Iran in 
Pakistan, for example, declared at a press conference in Multan, in February 1986. Ever 
since our revolution we have “supported the freedom fighters and waged struggle against 
oppressors and despots as we are fighting for true independence and rule of the people” 
(Muslim, 1986: 3). Iran’s support for Kashmir uprising was demonstrated forcefully when 
in January 1990, Tehran asked Inderjit Gujral, the Indian Foreign Minister, to cancel his 
visit to Iran in protest at violence against Kashmiri Muslims. Iran by mid-April 1990, 
remained only Muslim country other than Pakistan to have supported openly the Kashmir 
Muslims’ struggle. As Time analyst asserts: Iran’s strong protest to the Indian 
Government over its use of violence against Kashmir Muslims reveals Tehran’s growing 
interest in the separatist struggle for self-determination in Kashmir (Time, 1990 as quoted 
in Khan, 1999: 98).  
 
“Neither he nor anyone else could have predicted the growth in support for the Islamic 
movement, which came in later years, especially after the Iranian revolution in February 
1979. This resurgence could not have more dramatically demonstrated by the Afghan 
resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979” (Schofield, 1996: 220).  
 
Professor Mustapha Kamal Pasha, who teaches Political Science at Webster University of 




Rather than focus on the Kashmir development issue directly in terms of the 
dominant matrix of Indo-Pakistan relations, our strategy is to examine the 
problem from the wider perspective of Kashmir’s relations to the growing ferment 
in the Muslim world, with a more potent, self-conscious Islam providing the key 
element for cultural Kashmiri identification. Paradoxically going beyond the two-
nation divide and examining the Kashmir issue from this wider angle gives new 
meaning to the two-nation theory, as we shall see later. In this context, the battle 
between two rival nationalisms and between secularism and religiously-
conditioned territorial claims do not disappear but instead acquire a new language. 
The interjection of Islam into the political equation gives Kashmiri nationalism a 
new twist, pushing the question of self-determination onto the centre-stage, but 
also reforming it. . . . The new identity, more developed and revitalised may not 
be inconsistent with a widespread pro-Pakistan sentiment, but neither does it 
depend on it entirely. Kashmiri Muslims can now seek ideological sustenance 
from a transnational Islam, while simultaneously basking in the guaranteed 
patronage from across the border. Beginning with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
the mood of Islamic reassertion in the far reaches of the world of Islam—from 
Palestine to Pakistan, the Soviet Central Republics and Sinkiang to the Far East—
has provided an awareness of faith and collective power that can rarely escape 
Muslims, especially those who live under conditions of subordinaton and find the 
alternative, secular mode of being, lacking in material and moral fulfilment 
(Pasha, 1992: 369-377). 
 
 
Seen thus, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave them added stimuli to foster such a 
religious-based identity among them, and inspire them to rise them against the ruling elite 





ii. The Soviet fiasco in Afghanistan (political /religious factor)   
  
A number of writers have referred to the “Afghan factor” although they did not treat it 
elaborately (Ganguly, 1997; Rahman, 1996, Schofield, 1996). While giving an interview 
to this author, the Indian Ambassador, in Seoul, singularly stressed on the critical role 
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that the Afghan factor played in fermenting the uprising. The Ambassador regarded the 
Afghan issue as a “key event” in that it created the ground for the Pakistani involvement. 
Pakistan, which became embolden out of the Afghan crisis when finally Afghanistan 
became the Soviet fiasco, got the incentive to wage same kind of low-intensity war in 
Kashmir as it did it in Afghanistan side by side with the Afghan mujahideen.33  The long 
involvment in the Afghanistan crisis taught the Pakistani Generals that low-intensity war  
was cheap, feasible, and an alternative to the costly conventional war. In such war, small 
powers can defeat the great ones. The Afghans, who fought two great Afghan wars 
against Great Britain to foil its strategic plan what came to known as the Great Gamble in 
Central Asia, proved to be historically well-trained fighters (Ahmed, 1984: 3). They are 
the best contemporary example, which established the precedent that it is possible to 
defeat great power through armed conflict. When the Kashmiri rebels discovered that 
their long-drawn “peaceful resistance” yielded no result, but the “armed resistance” 
applied by the Afghans in driving out the Soviets proved quite successful, the Kashmiri 
rebels switched from their hitherto ineffective model of “peaceful resistance” to the 
model of “armed resistance”.34 In their process of switching from the model of “peaceful 
resistance” to that of the model of “armed resistance” the Afghanistan case provided 
them with the  “diffusion” effect.   
 
 “A small nation with a small population with the limited resources and weapons rose in 
revolt against the Soviet onslaught in Afghanistan, to the extent that the Soviet Union 
ultimately disintegrated into fragments,” says Azam Inquilabi, a teacher in Srinagar at 
                                                          
33 Interview on Friday, 25 February 2000. 
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this time. “Out of that five Muslim states emerged as independent states. So we got 
inspired, if they could offer, tough resistance to a super power in the east, we too could 
fight India.” (Quoted in Schofield, 1996: 220). The Afghan Mujahideen’s successful 
attempt to drive away the Soviet army from Afghanistan has had its strong “diffusion” 
effect on the Kashmiris. This also encouraged the Kashmiri rebels  in fighting against the 
Indian government, and boosted their morale on the same line of their Afghan Muslim 
brethren.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 The author is thankful to the Pakistani Ambassador for bringing  this crucial point to his notice while the 
latter gave an interview to the former on Thursday,  24 February 2000 at the latter’s Seoul office.  
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 iii. The rise of the Palestinian Intifada and the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state (cultural/religious factor)  
 
It is another successful story of modern time. The rise of the Intifada sends a strong 
message for the Kashmiri Muslims. A good number of Palestinians voluntarily received 
training in Afghanistan (Hewitt, 1995), and helped the Kashmiri rebels in their struggle to 
set up an independent state of their own. The Kashmiris drew their incentive from the 
recent successful establishment of a separate Palestinian state. They drew a similar logic 
if the Palestinians could do so, why they cannot? Such a kind of spirit fueled their 
consciousness. Their rise in the level of their consciousness has been possible because of 
their greater exposure to the media. That, in turn helped them to judge things in 
comparative perspective, thereby eventually leading them to mobilize themselves both 
ethnically and politically (Kashmir Report, 1999).  
 
iv.  The resurgence of ethnic-based uprising in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
(enthnonationalism factor)  
 
Two important works in this regard are by Misha Genny: The Return of History (1990), 
and The Fall of Yugoslavia (1992). In the 1992 work he has highlighted the forces of 
nationalism and the break down of the collective identity among the various ethnic 
groups in Yugoslavia that caused the country to crumble. The rebel leaders routinely refer 
to the case of former Yugoslavia which broke away on the ethnic lines, and the rise of six 
new Muslim states in Central Asia (Rahman, 1996: 6). Seen from the perspective of 
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“diffusion” theory discussed in section III, all these chain of events provided “diffusion” 
effects on the Kashmiris minds. These events, which helped generate similar kind of 
political, cultural, and religious consciousness among the Kashmiris, also inspired them 
to throw a direct challenge to the Indian ruling elite under the banner of pan-Muslim 






v. The Pakistani support for the uprising (“bad neighbor’s” policy?)  
 
Any objective discussion about the Pakistani support for the Kashmiri uprising must 
address the following key questions: 1. When did Pakistan get involved with the 1989 
uprising? 2. Did it get involved before the uprising broke out or after it? 3. Was the 
Pakistani support overt or covert, direct or indirect? 4. If Pakistani involvement was there 
before the outbreak of the uprising, then what was the nature of the Pakistani support? 5. 
Did Pakistan proffer military support or political, moral, and diplomatic support at that 
time? The preceding discussion in section IV shows that the Indian side could not come 
up with the conclusive evidences that Pakistan was actively, directly, and militarily 
involved with the uprising well before it broke out. Even the doyen of Indian defense 
analyst, K. Subrahmanyam failed to support his arguments that he put forward in his 
1990 work (Subrahmanyam, 1990: 111-139). Edward Desmond has pointed out (this has 
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been highlighted in section IV of this thesis) about Subramanyam’s admission that 
“Operation Topac”, which dates back to 1988 to justify Pakistani involvement well 
before the uprising, was “fraud” and “concocted” (1995:8). “Even so”, as Desmond 
asserts, “this non-existent game-plan for subversion is still cited by Indian writers, and 
there remains a deep suspicion in the Indian establishment that the Pakistani hand lies 
behind the trouble” (Desmond, 1995: 8).  
 
There is no denying that under the Pakistani President General Zia-ul Huq (General Zia 
declared Islam as the state religion of Pakistan) Islamization factor played a role in 
generating religious fundamentalism both in the Pakistani part and the Indian part of 
Kashmir. This process started ahead of the uprising. The Indian analysts show it as the 
evidence of Pakistan government’s involvement. The Indian Ambassador, in an interview 
with the current author, conveyed the same impression identifying the roots of the origins 
of the uprising stemmed from Pakistan.35 Evidences are there that the fundamentalist 
groups in Pakistan-part of Kashmir got actively involved in the uprising making the 
Pakistan’s government’s involvement unofficial and indirect. In 1992 it was discovered, 
that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had established an organization, named Markas-
Dawar, an international center to organize Islamic militant activities in Kashmir under 
the active guidance of Mulavi Zaki (Hewitt, 1995:186). The India Ambassador named a 
few fundamentalist parties who got involved in inciting the uprising in the Indian-held 
Kashmir before the uprising broke out.36 In addition, the fundamentalist groups from 
                                                          
35 Interview with the Indian Ambassador in Seoul, 25 February 2000. 
36 Interview with the Indian Ambassador in Seoul, 25 February 2000.  
The Markas-Dwar had provided not only training but also weapons to the Kashmiri rebels including the 
Hizbul. These weapons were the lef-tover from the Afghan conflict. It is also alleged that Markas-Dawar 
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Kashmir, such as Hizbul had the blessings to get support of the ISI, which had been 
spending about US $3.3 million dollars a month on training and weapon supplies 
(Anderson, mentioned in Hewitt, 1995: 186). Pakistan government has little control over 
the policy of the ISI. It should be mentioned here that since Pakistan’s inception it is the 
Pakistani top brass military who has the upper edge over the Kashmir policy vis-à-vis the 
Pakistani politicians. 
 
It is widely believed that Pakistan now provides arms and training to the rebels. To 
supply arms to the rebels before the outbreak of the uprising is one thing, and to do so in 
the aftermath of it is altogether a different thing, for both acts have different ramifications. 
Unless a distinction is made between the two, one will equate cause with effect. It is 
difficult to establish that Pakistan was invloved directly, officially, and militarily with the 
uprising before its outbreak. Edward Desmond, Tokyo Bureau of Chief, Time Life News 
Service, maintains: 
 
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has become a controlling influence on 
the Kashmiri insurgents, both in terms of their political agenda and their military 
operations. But it would be wrong to argue that in early 1990 Pakistan was in any 
direct way behind the militants. Islamabad was as surprised as New Delhi by the 
sudden dramatic outburst of sentiment for ‘Azadi (emphasis added Desmond, 
1995: 8).  
 
Hweitt has made similar observations on this point: “Direct evidence of Pakistani 
involvment is obviously notoriously difficult to prove” (Hewitt, 1995: 187). The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
involves not only Afghans, but also Egyptian, Iranian, Sudanese, Algerian, and Saudi activists (Hewitt, 
1995: 186).     
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Pakistani Ambassador told me Pakistan offers “moral and political support”.37 He was 
even hesitant to use the word “diplomatic support”. Recently General Rashid Qureshi, a 
spokesman for Pakistani armed forces said: “Kashmir runs in the blood of almost every 
Pakistani. There is no way we can expect Pakistanis to stop moral, diplomatic and 
psychological support for the Kashmiris” (Quoted in Levine and Hussain, 2000: 10). One 
may argue that this is nothing new as this kind of moral and political support was always 
there for the Kashmiri people in 1947 and 1965—a point that has been discussed in 
section II. It is in this light that this thesis argues that Pakistani involvement in the 1989 
uprising is tangential. Its involvement is both a cause and effect. It is a cause in that its 
moral support, which was there for the Kashmiris since 1947, had its “diffusion” effect 
on the rebels. All told it seems that Pakistani involvement was largely unofficial—an 












                                                          












It is your own interest that6 is at stake when your next neighbor’s wall is ablaze. 
 - Horace Epistles. 
 
 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
Kashmir remains the long-standing contentious bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. 
To India, Pakistan has no locus standi on Kashmir as its Maha Raja Hari Singh has 
acceded to it. To Pakistan, Kashmir is a disputed territory as the accession was not legal. 
The policy of the Indian ruling elite has been not to let Kashmir go independent. The 
rationale behind this is if Kashmir slips away, it will trigger a domino effect38 on the 
federal structure of India, risking a balkanization of India. The Pakistani rulers hold that 
without Kashmir becoming a part of its territory, its two-nation theory cannot be 
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substantiated. India can ill-afford to compromise its secular underpinnings because this is 
secularism that has made a pluralistic society like India to maintain its communal 
harmony. To the Muslims, secularism is a mask behind which India’s misrule is 
camouflaged.  
 
Evidently, the Muslims in Kashmir want to escape Indian rule. The various rebel groups, 
despite their ideological differences, also want the same. To tame them, India resorted to 
undemocratic and coerceive means to secure the unquestionable and unqualified loyalty 
of the Kashmiri Muslims to New Delhi’s rule. To the Kashmiri Muslims, their separate 
distinct Muslim identity compels them to become disloyal to India’s rule, making it a 
case of ethnonationalism. Thus, a loyal-disloyal like situation shapes the Center-State 
relations giving birth to internal war-like situations between these two competing actors.  
 
 
Two persons whose indelible mark shaped the contemporary history of Kashmir were the 
Indian first Prime Minster, Jawahralal Nehru (1947-1964) and the Prime Minister (first) 
and later the Chief Minister of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah (1947-52, 1975-
1983). The striking points of similarities between these two great persons were that both  
came from Kashmir; both were pandits; both were charismatic leaders, and both were 
secular-minded. They banked much on each other, as the preceding discussion has shown, 
to maintain a loyal-like situation as far as the relationship between the Center and State 
was concerned. Both cordiality and strain marked their relationship. The Nehru 
government, instead of fulfilling its pledge to put plebiscite into practice, began 
                                                                                                                                                                             
38 This is an official policy of the Indian government. The US-based Indian scholar Ganguly is an advocate 
of this offical view. Rizvi. a Muslim writer, has challenged this view. For compare and contrast, see 
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integrating Kashmir against the will of Kashmiris. The subequent governments pursed the 
same line of policy. Consequently, Kashmir became an issue of the crisis of governability. 
A disloyal-like situation arose when the interests of the Center and the State clashed. 
Abdullah, like a pendulum, kept swinging between the pole of loyalty and the pole of 
disloyalty. The same was true of Farooq Abdullah, the son of Sheikh Mohammed 
Abdullah. When Sheikh Abdullah and Farooq, under the pressure of the Center, became 
too loyal to the Center, it earned ire and dissent from the Kashmiris.  
 
 
The idea of the third option, that is, independence of Kashmir, always crisscrossed 
Sheiikh Abdullah’s mind. A hardheaded realist, Abdullah, convinced of the 
impracticality of joining to Pakistan39, threw his weight in favor of India. But when his 
government assumed a repressive nature toward the end his governance (post-1975 
period), Kashmiris assessed it as the betrayal to their nation by their own leader. 
Abdullah fell from the grace. Abdullah’s son, Farooq met with the same fate Now, the 
Kashmiri rebels routinely burn the effigies of both Abdullah and Farooq on their 
birthdays just as they burn the Indian flag on the independent day of India (15 August, 
1947). To the Kashmiris, their history is the history of “double betrayals”. Both the 
Indian leaders and their own Kashmiris leaders have betrayed their cause. As a result, 
they had to take their own cause in their own hands when repression by the Center 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Ganguly, 1997; 1996, 1992); and (Rizvi, 1993). 
39Objective analysis shows that hardly any political leaders from the key four provinces of Pakistan 
entertain the idea of the practicality of the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. On this perspective see (Shah, 
1995: 103-112; Samad, 1995: 65-78). 
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reached no point of return. The road they chose was an uprising asserting their right to 
self-determination as a separate nation.   
  
 Although causes of the Kashmiri uprising ranged from socio-economic to religio-cultural 
to political factors, it was chiefly an internally driven uprising. In the whole process, it 
was the elite’s decision that acted as a pivotal factor. A thirteen set of causal factors that 
explains the uprising shows that the triggering factors and the most-immediate catalytic 
factors explain why the uprising broke out in 1989 and not before. By contrast, the whole 
set of thirteen causal variables explains why the uprising flared-up.  
 
While the internal dyamics were the key explanatory variables, some external factors 
discussed also reinforced these underlying causes. The confluence dynamic—the meeting 
point of internal and external dynamics—has reinforced the uprising giving it a sever 
form. 
 
Evidently, the Kashmiri rebel groups have threatened the Indian rule in Kashmir. To 
continue its rule, New Delhi has been pursuing a repressive policy to eliminate the 
resistance of the Kashmiri rebel groups. In contrast, the rebels have been following a “hit-
and-run” guerrilla strategy to win their jihad, holy war. For Pakistan, it was a good 
opportunity to revenge against India as Islamabad was hell-bent on doing so since its 
defeat in the 1971 war by India. In this connection, it is worth bearing in mind that India 
is an emerging dominant regional power, whose likes and dislikes, motive and 
temperament as well as power-weight in the matter of regional politics of South Asia are 
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of crucial importance. So long as the basic image-perception of India and Pakistan 
towards each other remains as it is 40  there is little likelihood to have a durable 
rapprochement between them.  
 
Now is a crucial time for New Delhi and Islamabad to reassess their images and give up 
imaginary fears. Pakistan can embolden itself by borrowing power from outside and 
strengthen its credibility against India. It will be foolhardly for Islamabad think that 
borrowed power could tip the balance of power in its favor giving it a position of strength 
over New Delhi. Any future war between a nuclear-armed India and a nuclear-armed 
Pakistan would be disastrous and therefore any attempt by either of the two to bully the 
other might prove a self-committed national suicidal. 
 
As indicated, the Kashmir issue was boxed in the bilateral relationship of India-Pakistan 
since their inception. With the outbreak of the 1989 uprising the peace and stablity of the 
subcontinent hangs on uncertainity—a situation where India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris 
have a stake.   
 
Undeniably, the subcontinental peace and stability depend on their pragmatic behavior. 
Their sensible dealings with each other will augur well for the subcontinent; the contrary 
will bode ill for the region. The saddest part is that their objectives of increasing military 
                                                          
40 The crux of the problem lies with their historical images that each has portrayed for each other over the 
long periods as a result of which they had to follow a divergent foreign policy. Wayne Wilcox has pointed 
out that India considers Pakistan a hostile state and Pakistan views India “a proven aggressor” as referred to 
in (Choudhury, 1968: 230). On this point also see, (Nayar, 1969).  
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expenditure remain unachieved. Their bilateral history shows that a reckless playing of a 
diplomatic poker has always brought only national setbacks for them.  
 
Kashmir keeps bleeding as it bled in the past41. Under the state of flux that characterizes 
the Kashmir post-uprising situation, New Delhi and Islamabad, wittingly or unwittingly, 
will keep jockeying and jostling with each other in an attempt to flex their muscles to 
each other—an exercise that may warrant any untoward incident entailing a fresh conflict 
between them. Under the circumstances, Kashmir, often referred to as the paradise of the 
earth, will continue to bleed profusely.       
 
 Appendix I 
KASHMIR CHRONOLOGY 
The Pre- Muslim Period of the history    }    From the earliest times to 1320 A.C.  
of Kashmir embracing Vedic, Buddhist            } 
and Brahmanical Times                                     } 
 
The Sultans of Kashmir                                 }   1320 to 1560 A.C. or 240 years  
beginning with Sultan Sadr-ud-Din                             [From 1323 to 1338 A.C.the interval 
(Rinchana) to Sultan Habib Shah                                of 15 years is taken up by Udayana 
                                     deva’s and Kota Rani’s rule.] 
 
                                                          
41 The acts of atrocities committed by the Indian army in Kashmir have surpassed all its past record. On this 
point see (Human Rights Watch /Asia, 1996). Many Brtish Parliamentarians and American Senators have 
vehemently protested the Indian army’s acts of atrocities. See, the vedio film, Kashmir: The True Story. 
Produced by the Pakistan Television, 1998.   
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The Chaks                                                        }            1560 to 1586 A.C. or 20 years. 
The Mughuls                                                    }            1586 to 1752 A.C. or 166 years. 
The Afghans                                                     }            1752 to 1819 or 67 years. 
The total length of Muslim rule in Kashmir }             240+26+166+67=499 years. 
The Sikhs                                                          }             1819 to 1846 A.C. or 27 years. 
The Dogras—From Maharaja Gulab Singh to  }             1846 to 1925 A.C. or 79 years. 
Maharaja Pratap Singh excluding the present                 [ In 1946 Dogra rule in Kashmir 
Ruler Maharaja Hari Singh                                               completed its century.] 
Source: SUFI, G.M.D. 1974. Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir: From the Earliest Times to Our Own. 





THE TREATY OF AMRITSAR [MARCH 16, 1846] 
 
Treaty between the British Government on the one part and Maharaja Gulab Singh of 
Jammu on the other concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick Currie, 
Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montogomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of the 
Right Honorable Sir Henry Hardings, G.C.B. one of Her Britannic Majesty’s most 
Honorable Privy Council, Governor-General of the possessions of the East India 
Company, to direct and control all their efforts in the East Indies and by Maharaja 
Gullible Singh in person—1846. 
 




 The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in independent 
possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or 
mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus 
and the westward of the River Ravi including Chmba and excluding Lahul, being part of 
the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the 
provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, date 9th March, 1846. 
 
     Article 2 
 The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharaja 
Gulab Singh shall be laid down by the Commissioners appointed by the British 
Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh respectively for that purpose and shall be defined 
in a separate engagement after survey. 
     Article 3 
In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs the provisions of the 
foregoing article Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of 
seventy-five lakhs of Rupees (Nanukshahee), fifty lakhs to be paid on ratification of t he 
Treaty and twenty-five lakhs on or before the Ist October of current year, A.D. 1846. 
 
    Article 4 
The limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be at any time 
changed without concurrence of the British Government. 
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    Article 5 
Maharaja Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any 
disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or 
any other neighbouring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government. 
 
    Article 6 
Maharaja Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join, with the whole of his 
military forces, the British troops, when employed within the hills or in the territories 
adjoining his possession. 
 
    Article 7 
Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to take or retain in his service any British 
subject nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the 
British Government. 
 
    Article 8 
Maharaja Gulab Singh engages to respect in regard to the territory transferred to 
him, the provisions of Article V, VI, and VII of the separate Engagement between the 
British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated 11 March 1846. 
 
    Article 9 
The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting 
his territories from external enemies. 
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    Article 10 
Maharaja Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government 
and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one 
horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of 
Cashmere shawls.   
 
The Treaty of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esquire, 
and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under directions of the Right 
Honorable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General, on  the part of the British 
Government and by Maharaja Gulab Singh in person, and the said Treaty has been this 
day ratified by the seal of the Right Honorable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B, Governor-
General.  
(Done at Amritsar the sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the seventeenth day of Rubee-
ul-Awal 1262 Hijree) 
 
     (Signed) F. Currie 
      (Signed) H.M. Lawrence 
                                              (Signed) H. Hardinge (Seal) 
 
By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India.                
      (Signed) F. Currie 
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Appendix III  
THE INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
STATE (OCTOBER 26, 1947) 
 
Whereas, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of 
August 1947, there shall be set up an Independent Dominion known as India, and that the 
Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omissions, additions, adaptations and 
modifications as the Governor General may by order specify, be applicable to the 
Dominion of India; 
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And Whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor General 
provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of 




I Shriman Indal Mahandar Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu 
Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipathi, Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, in 
the exercise of my sovereignty ion and over my said State Do hereby execute this my 
Instrument of Accession and 
 
1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the 
Governor General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other 
Dominion authority established for purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my 
Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes 
only of the Dominion, exercise in relation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
(hereinafter referred to as “this State”) such functions as may be vested in them by or 
under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on the 15th 
day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereafter referred to as “the Act”). 
   
2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the 
provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by 
virtue of this my Instrument of Accession. 
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3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with 
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.  
  
I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an 
agreement is made between the Governor General and the Ruler of this State whereby 
any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion 
Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be 
deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly. 
The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of 
the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by 
me by [in] an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument. 
Nothing is this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to Make any law for 
this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby 
undertake that should the Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in 
this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at 
their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be 
agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the 
Chief Justice of India. 
 
Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of 
any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with 
the Government of India under any such future constitution. 
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Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over this 
State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, 
authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at 
present in force in this State.  
 
I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any 
reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as 
including a reference to my heirs and successors. 
 
Given under my hand this twenty-sixth day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven. 
HARI SINGH 
Maharajadhiraj of Jammu and Kashmir State.  
 
ACCEPTANCE OF INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU & KASHMIR 
STATE BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA 
 
I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession. 
Dated this twenty-seventh day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven. 
      Mountbatten of Burma 
      Governor-General of India  
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SCHEDULE OF INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION THE MATTERS WITH 
RESPECT TO WHICH THE DOMINION LEGISLATURE MAY MAKE LAWS 
FOR THIS STATE 
A. Defence 
1. The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion and any other armed forces raised 
or maintained by the Dominion, any armed forces, including forces raised or maintained 
by an acceding State, which are attached to, or operating with, any of the armed forces of 
the Dominion. 
2. Naval, military and air force works, administration of cantonment areas. 
3. Arms, fire-arms, ammunition. 
4. Explosives 
 
B. External Affairs 
 
External affairs, the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries; 
extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His 
Majesty’s Dominions outside India. 
2. Admissions into, and emigration and expulsion from, India, including in relation 
thereto the regulation of the movements in India of persons who are not British subjects 






1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms 
of communication. 
2. Federal railways; the regulation of all railways other than minor railways in respect of 
safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and services terminal charges, 
interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of 
goods and passengers; the regulation of minor railways in respect safety and 
responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods and passengers. 
3. Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on tidal waters; 
Admiralty jurisdiction. 
4. Post quarantine. 
5. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and the 
constitution and powers of Port Authorities therein. 
6. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of 
air traffic and of aerodromes. 
7. Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for the safety of 
shipping and aircraft.    
8. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air. 
9. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force belonging to 





1. Election to the Dominion Legislature, subject to the provisions of the Act and of any 
Order made thereunder. 
2. Offences against laws with respect to any of the aforesaid matters. 
3. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the aforesaid matters. 
4. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the aforesaid matters but, 
except with the consent of the Ruler of the acceding State, not so as to confer any 
jurisdiction or powers upon any courts other than courts ordinarily exercising jurisdiction 






THE ARTICLE 370 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1950) 
 
370* (Temporary provision with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir)— 
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-- 
(a) the provision of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir; 
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to— 
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in 
consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the 
President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of 
Accession governing the accession of the state to the Dominion of 
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India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature 
may make laws for that State; and  
(ii) such other matters in the said Lists, as with the concurrence of the 
Government of the State, the President may by order specify. 
Explanation—For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means 
the person for the time being recognized by President as the Maharaja of Jammu 
and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in 
office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948; 
(c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State 
subject  
(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that 
State subject to such exceptions and modification as the President may by 
order** specify: 
Provided that no such order which relates to the matter specified in the Instrument of 
Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued 
except in consultation with the Government of the State: 
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred 
in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that 
Government. 
(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of 
sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause 
be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the 
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Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for 
such decision as it may take thereon. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provision of this article, the President 
may, by public notification declare that this article shall cease to be operative or 
shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications from such date as he 
may specify: 
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the state referred to in 
clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
* In exercise of the powers conferred by this article the President, on the recommendation 
of the Constituent Assembly of the Sate of Jammu and Kashmir, declared that, as from 
the 17th day of November, 1952, the said artc.370 shall be operative with modification 
that for the Explanation cl. (1) thereof, the following Explanation is substituted namely: 
“Explanation: For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State means  
the person for that time being recognized by the President on the recommendation of the 
Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-I-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting 
on the advice of the Council Ministers of the State for the time being in office.”  
   
** See the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. (C.O. 48) as 














    
 
Appendix V 
 THE TASHKENT DECLARATION [ JANUARY 10, 1966] 
 
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and 
having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their 
firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to 
promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the 
attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million 
people of India and Pakistan. 
(I) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that 
both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations 
between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations 
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Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have 
recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. 
They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the 
Indo-Pakistani sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and 
Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. 
It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each 
of the sides set forth its respective position. 
 
    Troops Withdrawal 
(II) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not 
later that February 25, 1966, to the position they held prior to August 5, 
1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms of the cease-fire 
line. 
(III) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. 
(IV) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the 
other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the 
development of friendly relations between the two countries. 
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Trade Relations 
(V) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High 
Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that 
the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will 
be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention 
of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse. 
 
(VI) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade 
relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between 
India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing 
agreements between India and Pakistan.  
 
(VII) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out 
the repatriation of the prisoners of war. 
 
(VIII) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that both sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the 
problem of refugees and eviction of illegal immigration. They also 
agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the 
exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the 
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property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the 
conflict. 
Soviet Leaders Thanked 
(IX) The prime minister of India and the President of Pakistan a have 
agreed that both sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at 
other level on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides 
have recognized the need to set up joint Indo-Pakistani bodies which 
will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps 
should be taken. 
 
(X) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their 
feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and 
noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in 
mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and 
friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their 
overwhelming reception and generous hospitality. They invite the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this 



















THE SIMLA AGREEMENT [JULY 02, 1972] 
 
1.The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India are resolved that the two 
countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their 
relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the 
establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth 




In order to achieve this objective the Government of Pakistan and the Government of 
India have agreed as follows: 
 
(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall 
govern the relations between the two countries;  
(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful 
means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement 
of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall 
unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, 
assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance 
peaceful and harmonious relations; 
(iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation good neighbourliness and durable 
coexistence, respect for each other’s internal affairs, on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit; 
(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the 
relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved 
by peaceful means;  
(v) That they shall always respect each other’s unity, territorial integrity, 
political independence and sovereign equality; 
(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of each other.  
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2. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda 
directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such 
information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.  
 
3. In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries 
step by step, it was agreed that: 
 
(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, 
land, including border posts, and air links including overflights. 
(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the 
nationals of other country. 
(iii) Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be 
resumed as far as possible. 
(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. 
 
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time 
to work out the necessary details. 
4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the 
Governments agree that:  
(i) Pakistani and Indian forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the 
international border. 
(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of 
December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to 
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the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it 
unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. 
Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force 
in violation of this line. 
(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of the Agreement 
and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof. 
 
5. The Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with 
their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the 
date on which the Instrument of Ratification are exchanged. 
6. Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually 
convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two 
sides will meet to discuss further modalities and arrangements for the establishment of 
durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of 
prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
resumption of diplomatic relations.  
 
 (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)     (Indira Gandhi) 
                 President       Prime Minister  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan                                    Republic of India 















AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIBERATION 
FRONT AND HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN [APRIL 02, 1993] 
   A G R E E M E N T  
We the following signatories belonging to Hizbul-Mujahideen Jammu Kashmir (HM) and 
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) agree on behalf of their respective 
organisations on the points detailed below subject to approval by respective highest 
policy making bodies of the two organisations:- 
1.that Hizbul-Mujahideen Jammu Kashmir recognises JKLF’s right to preach and project 
its ideology of independence of the whole state. Similarly JKLF does not have any 
objection to HM preaching and projecting its ideology of State’s accession to Pakistan. 
Nevertheless both the organisations agree that while preaching their ideology or 
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otherwise, neither organisation will, directly or indirectly, have any negative criticism of 
the ideology, leadership or the programme of the other organisation. 
2. that  both JKLF and HM agree on the point of view that the right of self-determination 
of Kashmiri people can neither be limited nor conditioned and that Kashmiri people have 
full right to determine the future of the State according to their free will. If in free 
exercise of their right of self-determination the majority of the people of the sate vote for 
State’s accession to Pakistan, JKLF will accept this popular verdict and if the majority 
votes in favour of complete independence of the State, HM will accept this popular 
verdict. 
 
3. During freedom struggle, both organisation will cooperate with each other in their fight 
against their common enemy, Indian colonialism. They also agree that, if and when 
needed, both organisation will extend moral, military and political support to each other. 
4. That in case of any difference arising between the two organisation, and committee 
consisting of nominees of the two parties will settle the dispute. 
  Signed this Friday, the 2nd April 1993 at Islamabad (Pakistan) 
FOR & ON BEHALF                                          FOR & ON BEHALF 
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION                 HIZBUL-MUJAHIDDEN JAMMU 
FRONT                                                               KASHMIR                
Name & Desgination                 Signature           Name & Desgination               Signature     
1. Riya Mohammed Mozaffar     (Signed)           1. Abdul Majeed Dar              (Signed) 
     Snr Vice Chirman JKLF                                     Advisor General 
2. DR. HAIDER HIJAZ               (Signed)            2. Shamsul Haq                      (Signed) 
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     Central Press and                                                Member Supreme 
      Publicity Secretary                                             Command Council 
3. DR. FAROOQ HAIDER          (Signed)              3. Prof Ashraf Saraf               (Signed) 
    Senior Leader                                                       Representative of Jamet-e 
                                                                                  -Islami for Tehrik-I- Hurriyat-  
Kashmir 
 
Source: RAHMAN, Mushtaqur 1996. Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New 
Opportunities for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People. Boulder: London: Lynne 




THE PROFILE OF THE KEY KASHMIRI REBEL GROUPS  
 
1.Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 
In 1966 Maqbool Butt and Amanullah Khan formed the JKLF. Originally the JKLF was 
an offshoot of the Plebiscite Front. It champions Kashmir nationalism, and is against 
Islamic fundamentalism. This group’s objective is to establish an independent Kashmiri 
state. Its student wing, known as the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation Front 
(JKSLF), has emerged as a powerful freedom fighter’s group killing important 
government officials and kidnapping Rubbiyya Sayeed. 
        
2. Hiz-bul- Mujahideen (HUM) 
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 The HUM is considered to be the most strongest and powerful group. It is held that this 
group has a membership of 11,000 young men mostly coming from the districts of 
Badgam and Barmula. Ideologically, this group has leanings towards Islam and jihad 
(holy war). This group came to the limelight following the kidnapping and eventual 
killing of Mir Mustafa, a former member of the legislative assembly in March 1990. The 
HUM is dead against Western values, and it forces the closure of bars, beauty parlors, 
and cinema halls in the Valley. Most important, it is believed that the HUM has close 
connection with the Afghan rebels. 
   
3. Tehrik-i-Hurriyat-I-Kashmir 
Formed in March 1990, this group is a conglomeration of 11-party alliance.  They include 
the following groups: the Muslim Conference, the Peoples League, Mahazi-Azadi, Jamat-
i-Islami, the Islamic Student League, the Islamic Study Circle, Jamat-I-Tulba, Tahrik-I-
Nifaz-I-Shariyat, Jamiat Ahle Hadith, Dukhtaran-I-Millat (Daughters of the Nation), and 
the Jammu and Kashmir Bar Association. Ideologically, it is tailored towards Islamic 
values while stressing  on “freedom and Islam. This group holds that the Kashmiri people 
have a right to self-determination. It believes Kashimir’s accession to India is a transient 
phenomenon. It advocates a United Nations resolutions-based solution to the Kashmir 
problem. Young academics, legal practitioners, professionals comprise the members of 
this group 
       
4. Dukhtaran-I-Millat 
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A constituent of Terik-I-Hurriyet-I-Kashmir, this groups came into existence in 1987 as a 
women’s wing of Jamiat-i-Tulba. Following the uprising, the group has encouraged 
women to arm themselves to defend against transgressions by security forces. It 
collaborates with another women’s organization, the Muslim Khwateen Mahaz (Muslim 
Women’s Center), an affiliate of the JKLF. Members are educated women who hold 
rallies, block traffic, and conduct procession in defiance of Section 144 that forbids the 
assembly of more than four people. The members of this group are trained as paramedics 
to help the injured . Both wings visit houses in an attempt to persuade women to joint the 
movement. 
 
Source: RAHMAN, Mushtaqur 1996. Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, 
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